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THE LUBECK UPRISING OF 1408 AND THE DECLINE OF THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE*

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THE URBAN uprisings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Western Europe remain a vexing interpretive problem despite a wealth of individual studies and occasional efforts to synthesize them. Debate still turns on even the most basic questions, such as the nature of the groups which took part in them, their causes, and whether or not they are part of the "crisis" which, increasingly, is seen to pervade many aspects of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century life. The most recent work suggests that perhaps the flaw lies not so much with the research or the evidence but with the assumptions historians have made—particularly the assumption that all uprisings of the period share common features and belong to a common category. It now seems more likely that there are several types of uprisings, with some sparked by artisans, but also some by wealthy merchants; some tied to individual economic or social distress, but also some which were for the most part exactly what their participants said they were, protests against high taxes and the people and policies which required the taxes.[1]

The Lubeck uprising of 1408 offers an excellent opportunity for a case study to test these conflicting interpretations and assumptions. Lubeck, the famed "Queen" of the Hanseatic League and a major commercial metropolis in spite of her relatively small population of 22,000 to 24,000,[2] was at or near the height of her wealth and power around 1400. She was also no stranger to urban unrest, having felt minor disturbances, apparently stemming almost wholly from lesser artisans such as butchers and bakers, in 1376, 1380, and 1384.[3] The events of 1408, however, far outstripped this previous experience: some two-thirds of the town council went into exile, and the citizens established a wholly new constitution providing for artisan representation on the council and citizen committees to advise and check the council. The new regime survived for eight years, during which time ripples from this event spread into the Baltic and the Empire, with on the one hand sympathetic citizen committees appearing in Rostock, Wismar, and Hamburg, on the other the "Queen" excluded from "her" Hanseatic diet and under the ban of the empire as well. The splits in both the Hanseatic League and her chief city were quickly exploited by their enemies. In the long run the uprising, though settled peacefully, helped thwart some of Lubeck's territorial ambitions; more importantly, the uprising revealed many of the Hansa's internal and external weaknesses which would lead to its gradual loss of both economic and political power in the northern seas.

In spite of its obvious significance for both urban political and social history as well as in the tale of the decline of the Hansa, no satisfactory detailed study of this major uprising exists.[4] What follows is an effort to fill this gap through the use of prosopography—the research method which seeks to evaluate a defined group by the collection

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[1] For a review of the recent literature on uprisings with particular relevance for this investigation, see Rhiman A. Rotz, "Investigating Urban Uprisings" (1976). The extant synthetic work is Michel Mollat and Philippe Wolff, *The Popular Revolutions of the Late Middle Ages* (London, 1973). For German and especially Hanseatic towns, a recent useful survey is Wilfried Ehbrecht, "Bürgertum und Obrigkeit in den hansischen Städten" (1974*a*). (Full references for all works cited in the footnotes may be found in the bibliography.)

[2] von Brandt, 1966: p. 219. Reincke, 1951*b*.

[3] von Brandt, 1959; Hoffman, 1889: pp. 140–142. There are severe problems in dating these earlier uprisings; for example, Ehbrecht, 1974*a*, believes that there were only two of them, in 1374 and 1384 (pp. 278–282).

[4] The uprising has in fact been examined in detail only once since the initial effort to reconstruct a narrative by Carl Wehrmann a century ago, and that work, too, is based primarily on literary sources. See Wehrmann, "Der Aufstand in Lübeck" (1878) and Edmund Cieslak, "Rewolta w Lubece" (1954). Some helpful suggestions toward an interpretation appear in Rörig, 1926: pp. 46–47 and Czok, 1963: pp. 103–110.

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of biographical evidence, particularly social and economic data, on each of its members.[5] Most often used for occupational or elite studies, the method can be applied to groups which have defined themselves politically—in this case the known proponents and known opponents of the uprising—and can be used to analyze the socio-economic composition of certain institutions—in this case, the Lubeck council before and after the uprising.

This paper will consider the uprising's place in the history of Lubeck and of the Hanseatic League as well as in the context of other uprisings. Evidence from prosopography will be used to determine the social and economic composition of the movement which established a new constitution in 1408, the behavior of the town's elite during the uprising years, and the effects of the uprising on Lubeck's governing institutions. From this examination and analysis will emerge not only a clearer picture of this uprising, but new insights into the problem of the decline of the Hansa and a better understanding of the relationship between citizens and their government in a fifteenth-century town.

1. THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE AT THE TURN OF THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY

The Lubeck uprising of 1408 was played out against a backdrop of complex power relationships in northern Germany, Scandinavia, and the Baltic. The year 1400 is often chosen as marking the approximate peak of the Hanseatic League and its member towns—towns which functioned to a great extent as "city-states," exerting influence throughout this area and perhaps aspiring to rule it, either individually or collectively.[6] Legally, most Hansa towns lay within the Holy Roman Empire; Lubeck was a free imperial city. But imperial government tended to be ineffective at best, particularly in the North, leaving its towns, free or not, with the burden of their own defense and foreign policy. The deposition of Wenceslas in 1400 made imperial rule even more hollow, as the claimants to the disputed throne proved to be far more interested in support—and funds—for their struggle than in governing. Towns and leagues of towns, the Hansa towns chief among them, had partially filled this vacuum by absorbing many of the political and military ruling functions of northern Germany and the Baltic to accompany their economic dominance, apparently with considerable success. The Hansa was, of course, victor of the Peace of Stralsund (1370),[7] and each of its member towns controlled castles and broad expanses of rural territory far beyond its walls.[8]

But on closer inspection, historians with the advantage of hindsight can see that the place of the Hansa towns on their "peak" was far from secure. The decline of the Hanseatic League remains to some extent an unsolved historical problem, but most modern authors at least agree that it must be seen as a gradual process with roots stretching back some 250 to 300 years before the last Hanseatic diet of 1669. Fritz Rörig believed that signs of deterioration were already evident in the 1370's, i.e. precisely in the era of the great Hansa victory in the Danish wars, and Ahasver von Brandt basically accepts Rörig's conclusions.[9] Philippe Dollinger considers the time from about 1400 to 1475 a period of "gathering dangers" for the Hansa, perhaps its "crisis," characterized by gradual and at first barely perceptible decline.[10] Konrad Fritze regards roughly 1400 to 1440 as the "turning point" of Hanseatic history, the time when the Hansa failed to build on its earlier victories and failed to adjust to new economic and political conditions, thus making its decline inevitable.[11] In spite of differences on precise dates and terminology among these historians, then, clearly the Hansa towns were in difficulty, if not

[5] On the general application of this method to premodern problems, see Strayer, 1971; for its particular usefulness in the study of uprisings, see Rotz, 1976. Examples of studies of unrest in Hanseatic towns which use prosopography are Ahasver von Brandt, "Die Lübecker Knochenhaueraufstände" (1959) and Rotz, 1973*a* and 1973*b*.

[6] Dollinger, 1970: pp. xxi, 62–82. Von Brandt, 1954: pp. 147–164. Schildhauer, 1963.

[7] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 67–72. On the Peace of Stralsund see the special issue of the *Hansische Geschichtsblätter* **88** (1970), with articles by Jochen Götze, Ahasver von Brandt, and Philippe Dollinger, pp. 83–162; also Bjork, 1932, and Fritze, 1971.

[8] Fritze, 1967*b*. Von Brandt, 1954: pp. 148–153.

[9] Rörig, 1971, especially the essay "Aussenpolitische und innerpolitische Wandlungen in der Hanse nach dem Stralsunder Frieden," pp. 147–166 (originally published 1925). A useful summary of some of Rörig's views in English is his 1932 article on the Hanseatic League for volume 7 of the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Von Brandt, *Geist und Politik in der lübeckischen Geschichte* (1954), pp. 26–29; "Recent Trends in Research on Hanseatic History" (1956), pp. 33–34. M. M. Postan, writing in the *Cambridge Economic History of Europe* 2 (1952): pp. 223–230, would place the beginning of decline even earlier.

[10] Dollinger, *The German Hansa* (1970), esp. p. 281.

[11] Fritze, *Am Wendepunkt der Hanse* (1967*a*), esp. pp. 7–16, 47–50, 178–185, 245–252. See also Fritze, 1963, and Schildhauer, 1963.

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in the early stages of decline, by 1400. There is also a remarkable degree of consensus among these four authorities on Hanseatic history as to the major factors which were causing Hansa weaknesses, so that in spite of some variation in tone and emphasis their interpretations may be collectively summarized. By about 1400 the Hansa merchants faced stiff competition from English and especially Dutch traders; stronger princes and monarchs with new economic and territorial policies placed severe pressures on the Hansa; the Hanseatic towns were unable to remain united in the face of different economic and political interests; and the basically conservative responses to these and other problems by the leadership of the Hansa produced no effective solutions. Further, all but von Brandt find that the uprisings in Hansa towns accelerated the development of one or more of these factors, and thus directly contributed to the League's decline.[12] No comprehensive review of all the literature on the decline of the Hansa can be attempted here but some brief discussion of at least these fundamental issues and their interrelationships can be useful to provide background for, and to help judge the significance of, the Lubeck uprising.

The Hansa had owed its initial rise to wealth and power in large measure to its domination of the key route between the Baltic and North Seas—the portage at the Holstein isthmus through Lubeck and Hamburg—in an age when seamen were reluctant to brave the treacherous Straits of Denmark. Its merchants also came to prominence because many of the regions which they visited had little or no commercial organization of their own. In the fourteenth century the Hansa began to lose both of these virtual monopolies. Significant numbers of Englishmen and Dutchmen began to enter long-distance trade, and were soon sailing around the Skaw to visit Scania, the rich herring fishery under the Danish crown which had until then depended almost totally on German merchants for its export. By about mid-century they had taken the next logical step, using the Sound in a direct all-water passage from the North Sea to the Baltic, and were appearing in the Wendish and Prussian Hansa towns; by 1388 there was an organized English merchant settlement in Danzig. The new route through Danish waters was both cheaper and faster, and also far more practical for bulky and heavy items since it avoided unloading and reloading. Gradually even some Hansa merchants, notably those from Prussian and Livonian towns, began to use it. Lubeck and Hamburg, naturally, continued to promote the overland portage as safer, but as seamen gained more experience in sailing the Skagerrak, Kattegat, and Sound, the chances of wreck were lessened. By 1400 English and Dutch merchants no longer hesitated to take textiles or other valuable cargoes on this route. On the whole, the Hansa merchants defended themselves successfully against the English; after the initial inroads had been made, the English share of commerce increased little, if at all, in the fifteenth century. It was English cloth, rather than English merchants, which had the greatest long-term effects. The Hansa's chief commodities were Flemish cloth, Scania herring, and Luneburg salt, carried for the most part in German ships, for exchange with the grain, forest products, and metals of the northeastern European lands. In the later fourteenth century England developed its own textile industry, and soon this cloth began to find an export market in Hanseatic territory. The challenge from Holland was even more thorough and thus more serious. By 1400 a large Dutch merchant marine was carrying Dutch cloth, North

[12] Agreement among these four historians is of course not total. The principal factors as given here correspond most closely to those of Dollinger, 1970; see also the 1964 review of an earlier edition of that work by William L. Winter in *Speculum* 39: pp. 700–702. Rörig, 1971: pp. 148–154 added to this list of factors the plague-induced end of the German "colonization movement," both from Westphalia to Lubeck and from Lubeck to the Baltic towns; he further saw the disintegration of Hanseatic unity primarily in this context, i.e., competition replacing cooperation among Hansa towns because the "colonies" had lost their direct ties to their "mother" towns. Von Brandt, 1956 and 1962, continuing the trend away from a basically political interpretation of the Hansa begun by Rörig, sees the League as almost totally an economic phenomenon; thus he tends to de-emphasize the internal Hanseatic political factors such as changes in the town councils and uprisings which Rörig considered important in the development of a "conservative" Hansa, and his 1959 study of the Lubeck "Butchers' Rising" does not treat it in a context of League decline. Fritz, 1964 and 1967*a*, though aware of the general nature of the problem of rising princes and monarchs, particularly emphasizes the resurgence of Denmark and the development of a Danish-Dutch alliance; since his work focuses on the Wendish towns, this emphasis seems entirely appropriate, and a similar emphasis has been adopted here. Fritze, as a Marxist, also places Danish-Hansa relations to some extent in a context of Scandinavian resistance to German "imperialism" with which von Brandt, 1962, would vigorously disagree. The differing content which each gives to the concept of "conservative Hanseatic leadership" will be dealt with below. More complete reviews of the literature which have appeared recently are von Brandt, 1956; Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 7–16; Harrison, 1971.

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Sea herring, and Bourgneuf salt to the Baltic—all products admittedly of inferior quality to the traditional ones, but also cheaper—and offering lower freight charges for the return trip. In summary, now there were clear alternatives to the one-time Hanseatic monopolies: an all-water transit route which avoided the great Hansa ports of Lubeck and Hamburg altogether; new merchants, new ships, and new products, underselling the Hansa ones in both West and East.[13]

The Hansa's strength had also depended in large measure on the weakness of, or cooperation of, central governments in the areas the German merchants visited. The League's geographic and economic position had been buttressed by privileges which gave Hansa merchants distinct advantages over natives and other traders. But in the latter half of the fourteenth century the political situation began to change. Waldemar Atterdag slowly rebuilt the power of the Danish monarchy from the ravaged state in which it had been left by the counts of Holstein. The dukes of Burgundy from 1384 gradually began to assemble, from the many lordships of the Low Countries, something approximating a centralized state. Many German princes attempted to expand their authority. A tendency toward stronger territorial rulers was not in itself necessarily a threat to Hansa activities, but these rulers also tended to pursue new policies and to have the power to put them into effect. In England, for example, Edward III, otherwise a defender of Hansa privileges, by encouraging Flemings with skills in textile manufacture to settle helped to create the new English cloth industry which began to undercut the position of Flemish textiles and thus of Hanseatic merchants. Later, when English merchants became increasingly angered at the contrast between the privileged Hansa position at home and the hostile reception Englishmen received in Hanseatic towns, his heir Richard II was persuaded to act against the League in order to win greater reciprocity for them. Philip the Bold and his successors, with more territory than any one ruler had previously assembled in the Low Countries, felt that the Hansa's staple-market at Bruges hindered the economic development of their other possessions, e.g., Antwerp or, when Burgundian rule expanded, Holland and Zeeland, and therefore pursued policies which favored other locales at the expense of Bruges. It was the Danish ruler, however, who probably had the greatest immediate impact on the Hansa, and certainly on Lubeck. A powerful king of Denmark could, if he so chose, strike at the strategic heart of the Hansa: the Sound and the Scania fisheries, with their great importance for both the Hansa and its competition, were under Danish rule, and Holstein, even Lubeck herself, lay easily within reach. When in 1360 Waldemar demanded higher payments for renewal of the privileges at Scania and then conquered Gotland, sacking Wisby, the League considered itself at war. Whether such rulers were consciously following "national" or "mercantilist" policies is a matter of some debate, but this question need not be resolved here. If they were only exploring new alternatives in order to see which policies would provide them with the greatest power and income, irrespective of "nationality," the effect on the Hansa was still the same. Waldemar's Danish expansion endangered the Hanseatic command of the Baltic; the English and Burgundian policies encouraged the growth of the Hansa's chief competitors while diluting the value of its privileges.[14]

The Hansa was ill equipped to face such opposition, having no effective monarch or prince behind it, in fact often viewed as an enemy by the imperial government and the various North German princely houses. Thus, in response to the economic and political changes of the fourteenth century, the Hansa took a perhaps necessary but fateful step. It decided to fill the gap itself by attempting to become the missing power. The Hansa of the thirteenth century is best described as an informal community of German merchants. Gradually, however, in a transition which cannot be pinpointed but which is clearly discernible after the diets of 1356–1358, it became a formal, although still loosely structured, association of German towns. The great merchant "factories" in Bruges, London, Bergen, and Novgorod lost their

[13] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 191–199, 285, 298–310, 373–374. Rörig, 1971: pp. 154–157, and 1932: pp. 263, 265. Von Brandt, 1954: p. 29, and 1962: pp. 17–18. Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 47–50, 67–82, and 1964. See also Postan, 1952: pp. 223–230, 244–256; Vollbehr, 1930: pp. 4–28. On the economic and political importance of the Sound see Hill, 1926.

[14] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 67–75, 112–115, 281–285, 373. Rörig, 1971: pp. 154–157, and 1932: p. 266. Von Brandt, 1954: p. 28. Fritze, 1967*a*: p. 50. On the Low Countries, see Bjork, 1938; on England, Palais, 1959. Also see Winter, 1957, a highly speculative and on the whole not very persuasive article, but one which nevertheless to some extent illustrates the difficulties for the functioning of the Hansa created by the development of strong national states.

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independence; decision-making passed to town governments, through their representatives at Hanseatic diets. The change gave the Hansa more authority, not least because the towns could summon up military forces, and was the underpinning for the great victories which followed: the defeat of Denmark in the wars of 1367–1370, successful embargoes of England and Flanders in 1388, renewal of all Hansa privileges in those lands. In the flush of triumph, few noticed the long-term effects of these political changes. The Hansa, while not a "state," had acquired most of the powers of one. To some extent it ruled territory, indirectly through its member towns, and on occasion even directly (for example, the fortresses on the Sound, held collectively for a time by the members of the Confederation of Cologne under the terms of the Peace of Stralsund). Certainly it had its "sphere of influence" which it would need to defend, like other great powers of the day (and since). In other words, now it had not only economic, but also political ambitions which could come in conflict with the policies of major rulers. But when such conflict came, the League's ability to act was ultimately dependent on the willingness of its member towns to unite. The emergence of the Hanseatic League as a political power thus in no way solved its problems; at best the towns had bought time for themselves, while multiplying the potential for difficulties in the future.[15]

The Hansa's successes in the West, for example, stopped neither the further development of the English monarchy nor more Burgundian acquisitions in the Low Countries, and gave only momentary setbacks to English and Dutch commercial expansion, while leaving a legacy of mutual hostility for coming generations.[16] The apparent halt to Danish growth proved to be similarly transitory. After Stralsund, the League seems to have reversed itself, deciding on a policy of friendship with Denmark. Perhaps the Hansa leaders were convinced that Denmark had been permanently weakened, but whatever the reasons for their policies, the price of that friendship proved high. For example, the terms of the peace treaty had given the towns control of the Danish fortresses on the Sound for fifteen years—placing the Hansa in a commanding position against their commercial competition. But this advantage slipped away when Margaret, regent of Denmark, demanded the return of the fortresses on the appropriate date in 1385, and the towns peacefully, though grudgingly, complied. The League also made no objection in 1397 when Norway and Sweden were absorbed into the Danish crown with the Union of Calmar. Whether the Hansa realized it or not, Denmark was again on the rise, as became immediately apparent in the struggle for Schleswig beginning in 1404. Ever since Margaret's reluctant grant of that duchy to Gerard VI, Count of Holstein, in 1386, the royal house of Denmark (which was not only overlord of Schleswig, but which also had probably the best hereditary claim to it) had waited for an opportunity to get it back. The death of Gerard in battle, leaving minor sons, set his widow against his brother for control of the duchy, an opening which Margaret used to place the sons—and thus not only Schleswig, but also Holstein—under the guardianship of her heir, and nominal king, Eric of Pomerania-Stolpe. If this expansion succeeded, both strategic points for trade in the northern seas, the Sound passage and the Holstein portage, could pass to Danish hands. Such an outcome would not necessarily be antithetical to Hansa interests if the alliance held; a strong Denmark which chose to be champion of the towns could have dealt a grave blow to their English and Dutch competition. The indications, however, were that such a policy was not likely, since Margaret in 1405 took steps to protect the non-Hanseatic merchants visiting Scania. We do not know whether the potential for an alliance between Denmark and the Dutch and English traders against the Hansa—an alliance which could allow the Danish expansion which the League had opposed while still insuring a commercial outlet for Danish goods—had already occurred to Margaret, as it did to her successors. But in any case, it is fair to say that by the early fifteenth century, most of the advantages which the Hansa had won over Denmark in 1370 had melted away.[17]

[15] See especially Dollinger, 1970: pp. 62–72, 106–112. The distinction between the "Hansa of the merchants" and the "Hansa of the towns" is a commonplace in the historiography of the League (although its negative aspects are much less frequently noted), e.g., Rörig, 1932: pp. 262–263; von Brandt, 1956: p. 32; Fritze, 1967*a*: p. 7; Daenell, 1905: 1: pp. 50–56; Stein, 1911; Schildhauer, 1963.

[16] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 73–77; Rörig, 1971: pp. 157–159; Fritze, 1963; Bjork, 1938; Winter, 1948; Palais, 1959.

[17] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 78–82 and 284, considers the return of the fortresses and acceptance of the Union of Calmar wise policies, noting that Margaret and the Hansa were at the time allied against Albert of Mecklenburg and the pirates he encouraged; on p. 373 he speculates on the benefits a permanent Hansa-Denmark as-

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The League's problems with England, the Low Countries, and Denmark were only the most obvious of its difficulties with stronger rulers in the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The same ineffective imperial rule which had led to the development of the towns as powers also made possible a resurgence of the various German princes in precisely the same period, and to any one town this nearby threat probably loomed at least as large as that from distant monarchs. Virtually all the Hansa towns owed at least nominal allegiance to a noble or bishop, and when these overlords attempted to assert their authority grave problems could result: an economic policy for the town which ran at cross-purposes to Hanseatic needs; pressure to make the town an ally of, or at least neutral toward, a declared Hanseatic enemy.[18] But whether feudal suzerain or not, a prince seeking to enlarge his power naturally would cast his eyes on a nearby town, and particularly on its rural lands and castles. The individual towns soon discovered that their territorial acquisitions in the countryside could be as much of a liability as an asset, involving them in frequent, and often hugely expensive, feuds with the landed nobility. Even Lubeck, which as a free imperial city had no neighboring overlord to fight, could not avoid territorial conflicts, and Lubeck's experience is an instructive example of the problem which is also directly relevant to its uprising. Initially territorial expansion, especially when along trade routes, had seemed a wise policy and apparently held the support of the citizenry, particularly merchants and others who were looking for low-risk investment opportunities in landed estates. Thus in the second half of the fourteenth century Lubeck embarked on an extremely ambitious policy along the trade routes to Luneburg and Hamburg which by 1400 had brought roughly one-third of the entire duchy of Saxony-Lauenburg under its sway. The town acquired the castles and bailiwicks of both Mölln, a key point on the Lubeck-Luneburg route, and Bergedorf on the Elbe River. In the same period, Lubeck citizens gradually displaced the lesser nobility on many of the landed estates in those bailiwicks. Then in the 1390's Lubeck and Eric III, duke of Saxony-Lauenburg (line of Bergedorf-Mölln), jointly began a canal between the Stecknitz and Delvenau rivers, a major development which would greatly speed the exchange of Luneburg salt for Scania herring, and would even draw a small amount of Baltic-North Sea trade through Mölln by providing an all-water route, though a shallow and circuitous one, to the Elbe and Hamburg. Such an extension of Lubeck's influence, however, made enemies for the town among powerful nobles. The dukes of Brunswick-Luneburg tried to stop construction of the canal in 1396, retreating only in the face of a major campaign by Lubeck. In 1401 Eric III died without direct heirs and Lauenburg was reunited under his distant cousin Eric IV of the Ratzeburg-Lauenburg line. In the inheritance dispute which followed, Lubeck abandoned Bergedorf to Eric IV in order to keep its hold on Mölln and the canal. But the peace bought by this maneuver was only temporary, as Eric IV remained hostile to the town, and by at least 1407 the expenses for defending Mölln outstripped the income from it. Also in 1401 Duke Albert of Mecklenburg had protested that the canal would divert salt trade away from his lands. His kinsman Balthazar, Prince of Werle, later supported by Duke Barnim VI of Pomerania-Wolgast, began a series of raids on Lubeck which by 1404 escalated into a major feud.[19] As we

sociation could have had. Von Brandt, 1962: p. 26, agrees to the extent that siding with Margaret was preferable to the prospects of a union of Denmark, Sweden, and Mecklenburg under Albert. Fritze, 1963, 1964, and 1967*a*: pp. 178–185 considers Hanseatic-Scandinavian hostility as a natural product of their economic relationships, and so considers these policies evidence of Hansa weakness; in any case, as he also points out, since the League was at war with Denmark again by 1426, the attempt to preserve friendship did not work in the long run. See also Dollinger, 1970: pp. 295–297; Hill, 1926: pp. 8–10; Niitemaa, 1960: pp. 96–110.

[18] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 112–115; Rörig, 1971: pp. 157–159; von Brandt, 1962: pp. 12–13, and 1954: p. 28; Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 82–114.

[19] For a good survey of the territorial policies and problems generally common to Hanseatic towns, see Fritze, 1967*b*, and also 1967*a*: pp. 82–114. On the specific policies and problems of Lubeck, see especially Düker, 1932, and Schulze, 1957; other helpful works are Hoffman, 1889: pp. 142–145; Wehrmann, 1895; Hartwig, 1908; Bertheau, 1913; Hefenbrock, 1927, and Fink, 1953. Works which touch on these issues from the points of view of Lubeck's neighbors Hamburg, Brunswick, Luneburg, and the Mecklenburg towns include Reincke, 1939; Fryde, 1964; Klünder, Lobsch, and Schultz, 1973.

It should be noted here that the details of the events relating to Lubeck's territorial policy were in fact more complicated than as outlined above. For example, Balthazar of Werle had apparently been an ally of Lubeck in the 1396 feud against the Guelphs, but felt that he had been insufficiently rewarded for his services; thus he continued his feud with Lubeck even after Duke Albert was granted a share in the income from the Stecknitz-Delvenau canal. We cannot be sure of either the starting

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shall see, these conflicts greatly contributed to Lubeck's difficult financial position which was the proximate cause of the uprising of 1408. It is also worth noting here, with Dollinger, Rörig, and Fritze, that a town which was weakened by an uprising offered an excellent opportunity to a prince seeking to fatten his holdings at its expense. It was no coincidence that Eric IV chose 1409 to make a major assault on the castle of Mölln.[20]

These economic and political pressures helped to dissolve what unity the Hansa had possessed. The term "League," as traditionally applied to the Hansa, deserves qualification. Both Dollinger and von Brandt prefer the word "community," as a means of expressing the loose structure and lack of precise organization which characterized the Hansa. Von Brandt further describes it as little more than a latent community of interests, subject at any time to realignment when a town's other needs superseded for the moment the common economic bond.[21] The difficulties of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries could only sharpen these centrifugal tendencies. For example, the opening of the route around the Skaw, and the Dutch and English presence in the Baltic, forced a cleavage of particular significance for Lubeck's role in the Hansa. Lubeck (and Hamburg as well) had an obvious vested interest in preserving the role of the Holstein portage as the principal transit point, so its policies tended to be actively hostile to any efforts to promote traffic through the Straits, whether English, Dutch, or Hanseatic. Other League members, notably Prussian and Livonian towns, had no such commitment to the traditional route; in the fourteenth century their merchants discovered that there was at least as much profit for them in dealing directly with Dutchmen and Englishmen, or in sailing the Sound themselves, as in channeling their commerce through Lubeck and Hamburg. This divergence of economic interests among Hansa towns found its reflection in their political posture as well. Lubeck could benefit economically from a war with Denmark that closed the Straits, since it would divert more commerce her way; Prussian and Livonian towns tended to be more interested in keeping the Sound open and thus much more hesitant to join in a Danish conflict. The Hansa towns of the Rhineland, whose trade rarely crossed either route, often held themselves aloof from both sides of this question. To such difference of interests must be added the reluctance of all towns to spend money. The decision of the Hansa to become a political power could only add more burdens to town treasuries already thinned by the feuds to defend their territories and expeditions to clear the waters of pirates which also occurred with greater frequency beginning in the later fourteenth century. For its military forces the Hansa depended on semi-voluntary contributions of ships, men, and funds from its member towns. It could expel towns which refused to submit levies agreed upon by its diet, but first the diet had to agree. Thus normally Hanseatic military campaigns were officially undertaken not by the League itself, but by a confederation developed specifically for that purpose. Even in the later fourteenth century some towns had already become reluctant to join such confederations solely because of their unwillingness to shoulder the expenses. Another difficulty, already mentioned, was a town's need to consider the policy of its overlord before going to war. Thus the great "Hanseatic" struggle against Denmark in 1367–1370, for example, was in fact actively supported by only about a dozen Hansa towns, mostly Wendish and Prussian (in alliance with the King of Sweden, the Duke of Mecklenburg, the Counts of Holstein, some Danish nobles, and even a few of the Dutch towns who were the Hansa's competitors). The blockade of Flanders in 1388 was achieved only by agreeing to spare the Teutonic Order and the Prussian towns from obedience to some of its terms. Yet these are the times in which the League is generally considered to have been most united. Clearly the "Hansa of the towns" which had emerged in the later fourteenth century was a fragile structure, and by 1400 any efforts at collective action faced a struggle to

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or completion dates of the canal: the chronicler Detmar describes it as completed by 1398, but other sources indicate that it was still partially unfinished in 1410. However, the central point—that all these feuds related to Lubeck's territorial ambitions in Lauenburg, especially the canal—is not affected by these complications. The relevant sources are in Karl Koppmann's (1899–1902) edition of Lubeck narrative documents, published as volumes 26 and 28 of the *Chroniken der deutschen Städte* (hereinafter abbreviated C **26** and C **28**), and in Wilhelm Mantels, Carl Wehrmann *et al., Lübeckisches Urkundenbuch* (1843–1905) (hereinafter abbreviated LUB). See especially C **26**: pp. 131–134, C **28**: pp. 19–24, 33; LUB **3**: nos. 323 and 707, LUB **5**: nos. 184 and 294.

[20] Dollinger, 1970: p. 139. Rörig, 1932: p. 266. Fritze, 1967*a*: p. 252.

[21] Dollinger, 1970: p. xx. Von Brandt, 1962: pp. 7–12. For a dissenting view, see Schildhauer, 1963 and 1974.

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surmount divergent town interests and depleted town coffers.[22]

And, although only Dollinger and Fritze make the point, it is worth noting that urban unrest in a member town also tended to divide the League. When the Hansa became an association of town councils, Hanseatic diets also naturally became points of appeal for dislodged town councillors, in spite of the usual position of the forces which had dislodged them that a town's internal affairs were its own and perhaps its prince's business, not the League's. The Hansa began attempting to affect the politics of its members as early as 1366, in the disorders in Bremen. The League responded to the Brunswick uprising of 1374 with its heaviest sentence of the fourteenth century: Brunswick was expelled from the Hansa, and its merchants denied the Hanseatic privileges and any trade with Hansa towns, until a settlement was reached in 1380. Just the threat of League action was enough to dissolve unrest in Stralsund in 1391. Clearly Hansa intervention was a powerful weapon which the extant town councillors could employ against their enemies. But, just as clearly, such efforts to determine the political directions of individual towns could create yet another set of divergent interests which could lead to further Hanseatic fragmentation. Obviously citizens of such towns might come to resent the Hansa, particularly those merchants who had taken no part in the uprising but who nevertheless had received severe economic punishment. Towns whose commerce was closely tied to an excluded town would have suffered along with it, and might join with the offenders in thinking that the Hansa had overstepped its authority. For example, there are indications in the evidence that Cologne, Hanover, and Hildesheim had opposed the afore-mentioned expulsion of Brunswick; further, during it some towns defied the Hansa's ban, notably Bremen and Magdeburg, which continued to trade with Brunswick merchants and to deal in Brunswick products until at least 1378. Such tensions were to appear even more distinctly in the Lubeck uprising of 1408: Rostock, Wismar, and Hamburg all came to ally with the new Lubeck regime in spite of the League's threat of action against it, in effect virtually removing themselves from participation in the Hansa and, as we shall see, increasing the League's vulnerability to princes and monarchs.[23]

Finally, our authorities all describe Hanseatic leadership and decision-making as "conservative," although there is some difference in the further content given that phrase. The greatest agreement among them is on the subject of Hansa economic policy. Once the German merchants had led the North in new commercial techniques and business practices, but by the fifteenth century apparently no ideas occurred to the leaders of the "Hansa of the towns" beyond trying to shore up the same weakening foundation. The classic example is the defense of the Bruges staple in spite of the gradual silting up of the harbor there and the shift of most commercial activity to Antwerp. Less well known are the sporadic League attacks on credit finance beginning in 1401. Hansa actions were not always such obvious attempts to recapture the past, but certainly its answer to competition was overwhelmingly to meet it not with lower prices and better practices in the marketplace, but rather with "protectionist" measures intended to force all northern commerce through the Hansa on its own terms. The diets resolved not only to reserve Hansa privileges for citizens of Hansa towns, but to forbid Hanseatic merchants to invest in any non-Hanseatic enterprises, including any partnerships with Dutch or English merchants. Needless to say, such measures did not destroy the competition, and in fact often worked to put Hanseatic merchants at a disadvantage; their principal effect, where they were successfully enforced, was to deny the Hansa any share in the commercial expansion of Holland and England.[24]

[22] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 67–77, 85–97, 106–129, 285, 372–373. Rörig, 1971: pp. 148–154, and 1932: p. 265. Von Brandt, 1954: p. 153, and 1962: pp. 7–11, 18–22. Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 250–252. See also Postan, 1952: pp. 223–230, 244–256, and Bode, 1919. On piracy, see Bjork, 1943. Even Hamburg, whose interests were clearly affected, was reluctant to join the Confederation of Cologne against Denmark because its funds were low from a series of feuds; see the comments by Hans Nirrnheim in his introduction to the Hamburg poundage book of 1369 (1910), pp. xi–xiv.

[23] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 137–140, 286–291; Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 245–252. On Brunswick, see Rotz, 1973*a* and 1973*b*, especially 1973*a*: p. 216. The evidence for the posture of other Hansa towns toward Brunswick appears in Karl Koppmann, ed., *Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansetage* (1870–1897) (hereinafter abbreviated HR) **2**: nos. 71 and 156; **3**: no. 316; and in Karl Kunze, ed., *Hansisches Urkundenbuch* **4**: no. 184. See also Czok, 1956 and 1957; Ehbrecht, 1974*c*; Daenell, 1905–1906: **1**: pp. 162–168; **2**: pp. 500–518.

[24] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 199–206, 374; von Brandt, 1954: p. 26, both of whom essentially confine their use of the term to economic decisions. Rörig, 1971: pp. 160–166, and 1932: pp. 265–266; Fritze, 1967*a*: especially pp. 47–50, 178–186, 245–252. For the further comments of Rörig and Fritze, see below. Note also Postan, 1952: pp. 244–256 and on Bruges, van Houtte, 1966.

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Both Rörig and Fritze have also applied the term "conservative" to the actions of Hanseatic leaders outside the realm of economics. Rörig considered Hansa foreign policy after 1370, particularly toward Denmark, simply an attempt to keep what had already been gained, in part because of a conscious decision, especially in Lubeck, that the League was "saturated," that it had reached or surpassed the limits of what it could easily maintain, that further expansion could only bring further difficulties.[25] Fritze, writing from an East German and a Marxist-Leninist perspective, also describes Hanseatic policy toward Denmark as a defense of the *status quo,* but from quite different motives. He agrees that it was led by Lubeck, but feels that it stemmed less from a vision of "saturation" than from a self-interested attempt to preserve Lubeck's position of dominance on the Baltic and in the Hansa, and to maintain Hanseatic "imperialism" by nipping Scandinavia's economic development in the bud. Lubeck's goals, according to Fritze, were to keep Denmark out of Holstein, to restrict the use of the Sound, and to block the penetration of English and Dutch competition into northeastern Europe. Whether such goals served the interests of the entire Hansa can be debated—certainly they offered little benefit to its Prussian and Livonian members—but Fritze sees that they would have restored Lubeck's role as the essential transit point between the Baltic and the North Sea, thus still indisputably "Queen of the Hansa," and would have kept Scandinavia in thrall to the German towns.[26]

In spite of their divergent points of view, both Rörig and Fritze additionally believe that the "conservative" pattern holds for internal town politics as well. Those who sat on the town councils defended the *status quo*—their possession of political power—against other citizens, and the League as a whole, with its policies of intervention against uprisings, backed them up. Their opinions of the causes and effects of this process, however, are virtually opposite. Rörig saw a more or less natural development over successive generations, in which the descendants of the great Hanseatic merchants retreated from the risk-taking which had made their family fortunes and turned instead to simply preserving their wealth in low-risk investments such as land and houses. There was, however, no corresponding retreat from the political power which their fathers and grandfathers had held, and so, increasingly, newly successful merchants were shut out from town councils and thus from decision-making. To Rörig it followed that men whose personal financial goals were "conservative" would have developed equally "conservative" economic and political policies for the town and the League. Uprisings, according to Rörig, accentuated this tendency. The artisans which he believed had led them were, as guildsmen, naturally "protectionist" in economics, and also resisted any higher taxation that might have underwritten an expansionist military campaign. Thus the councillors were further impelled, both by uprisings and by the desire to pacify the men who might create them, to adopt "conservative" economic measures and foreign policies.[27] Fritze, on the other hand, describes another relationship of internal politics to the decline of the Hansa. He agrees that Hanseatic towns were ruled by a narrow circle of families who had in part diversified their investments with property. When they governed in accordance with these economic interests, however, their policies brought them into conflict with the interests of other elements of the population, and eventually citizen unrest broke out. Fritze, indeed a Marxist, but one who has carefully read the evidence, finds no "class struggle" in these uprisings, but rather a mixed force of "plebs," artisans, and even some merchants in support of them—anyone whose economic needs ran at cross-purposes to those of the councillors. In his opinion such town councillors, and the Hansa when it supported them, showed their "decidedly reactionary" character in their response to unrest, since they would go to any lengths, from excluding the town from the League to alliance with the town's princely enemies, to restore the old regime. In short, Fritze sees not just "conservatism" but reactionary self-interest in the decisions of the Hansa leadership, both in its Lubeck-centered foreign policy and in its elitist posture toward its own citizens. In both respects, the Hansa was conducting a rear-guard action against progressive forces which was eventually doomed to fail.[28]

To summarize: the Hanseatic League by the turn of the fifteenth century faced vigorous competition from Englishmen and Dutchmen who were almost literally sailing around its monopoly, and hostility from stronger rulers who believed that

[25] Rörig, 1971: pp. 160–161, and 1932: p. 265.
[26] Fritze, 1967*a*: especially pp. 178–186, 250–251.
[27] Rörig, 1971: pp. 159–166, 216–246, 658–680. In his 1932 summary, p. 266, Rörig confines himself to saying only that uprisings "paralyzed" a town's "political vigor."
[28] Fritze, 1967*a*: especially pp. 251–252, and 1967*b*.

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Hansa power was throttling their own expansion. It met these challenges with its unity badly split by divergent town economic and political needs, and with only conservative responses. Under these general headings, urban unrest in Hansa towns may figure as a subsidiary issue. Dollinger and Rörig both see it as weakening the Hanseatic towns' stance against rulers. Dollinger also finds uprisings placing further strains on the towns' fragile unity; Rörig describes them as a force which accelerated the tendency toward defensive "protectionist" policies. For both of these, then, uprisings helped to cause the Hansa's decline. Fritze, however, views these disturbances more as a symptom of the Hanseatic regression, particularly as vivid illustrations of the bankruptcy of Hansa leadership. They presented opportunities for princes and led to further tensions within the League because the "reactionary" leadership was willing to risk those dangers in order to preserve their monopoly of power. One thing is clear: for a full evaluation of the significance of the events in Lubeck in and after 1408, they need to be investigated not only in the context of other uprisings but also with an eye for possible ties to the difficulties the entire Hansa was experiencing at the same time. Needless to say, one case study of one uprising will not "solve" the problem of the decline of the Hanseatic League; it may, however, better illuminate some of the aspects of that problem.

2. LUBECK, THE HANSA, AND THE LUBECK UPRISING OF 1408

Lubeck was the "Queen of the Hansa." Though not the largest town of the League in population, it was second only to Cologne, and generally functioned as the recognized leader of the towns. Usually Lubeck issued the invitations to Hanseatic diets and its councillors presided over the diets. Virtually all official League correspondence was sent and received by the Lubeck chancellery; in the absence of a diet, the Lubeck council handled most routine Hansa business and could claim with little challenge to speak for the League. Lubeck usually made the largest contributions to Hanseatic military forces, especially in naval actions, which often were commanded by a Lubeck burgomaster. Lubeck's central role in the Hansa stemmed from its location, its history, and its prosperity. It stood not only at the Baltic end of the Holstein portage, but also roughly halfway between the Prussian and the Rhenish towns, and so was both a convenient and a logical meeting place. Founded in the mid-twelfth century, it rapidly became the likeliest home for German, especially Westphalian, merchants seeking profit from the Baltic, and the principal embarkation point for German colonization of Eastern Europe. As such, it led the struggle for German economic control of the northern seas. Although by the turn of the fifteenth century it was no longer the indispensable transit port for Baltic commerce, nor the center of a migration which had by then largely ceased, still its merchants traveled not only to every point from London to Novgorod but to Atlantic ports and to Italy, returning with profits that had not visibly diminished. Its power, as we have seen, expressed itself not only through the Hansa but through council and citizen possessions in the countryside around the town, with land and castles in Holstein and Mecklenburg, and a partnership in a canal in Lauenburg. In short, Lubeck was not just a town; it was quite possibly the most ambitious, and certainly one of the most successful, of the North German "city-states." [29]

By the early 1400's, however, this decision to rule outside the walls on both land and sea was clearly straining town resources beyond the limits of citizen willingness to pay. The proximate cause of the uprising of 1408 was a town financial crisis, a refusal of citizens to accept higher taxes needed to offset town indebtedness. It was the pursuit of power on a regional and international level, both individually and as a principal architect of Hanseatic policy, which had led to wars and feuds, and these largely brought Lubeck to that financial crisis.[30] And, as we shall see, the uprising also had a significant impact on the town's ability to exercise power thereafter.

Signs of discontent in Lubeck had appeared as early as 1403, when the council requested excise taxes on various staples to help reduce its indebtedness, but guild and citizen protests, especially from brewers, caused them to retreat to a special tax levy of six marks from "all those able to afford it." [31] Further evidence that the council was aware

[29] See for example Dollinger, 1970: pp. 19–23, 117; Rörig, 1932: p. 264; von Brandt, 1954: pp. 147–164.

[30] On this point, see especially the comments of Wilhelm Bode, 1919: p. 212.

[31] The following narrative is based on the chronicles and other materials in C **26**: pp. 383–434, and C **28**: pp. 43–86, 358–367, and on the documents in LUB **5** and **6** and HR **5** and **6**. Some useful secondary narratives of the uprising are Wehrmann, 1878; Daenell, 1905: **1**: pp. 162–197; Pitz, 1959: pp. 292–297; Dollinger, 1970: pp. 286–291.

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of its relatively weak position is its care to secure citizen assent to a retaliatory campaign in the aforementioned feud against Balthazar of Werle and Duke Barnim (known in Lubeck as the "Wendish wars") before approving the policy. By 1405 a solution to the debt problem could no longer be postponed, and the council raised fees at the town mill and again proposed excise taxes, beginning with a levy on beer. It tried to anticipate citizen objections by suggesting that the citizens select certain persons to discuss the situation with the council.

The townspeople seized on that suggestion with a vengeance, and developed the Committee of Sixty, an independent group with the power to call citizen assemblies, which immediately delivered extensive and specific articles of complaint to the council. Their basic position was that the town's debt was the council's, not the citizens', fault, and therefore it was up to the councillors to find their own solution without overtaxing the citizenry. To justify this position, they specified instances of mismanagement and unsuccessful policies, such as the recent bankruptcy of the town mint; low rates of income from various municipal properties like meadows and wine cellars; failure to keep shipping lanes clear of debris and silt, pirates, and the ships of other towns, and the numerous feuds with nobles. The collective implication was that the council had been spending its best efforts on business of the Hanseatic League to the neglect of local affairs. It also seems that the Sixty was groping toward opposition to further territorial expansion. It not only criticized the council's policy in the usual way—too much expense for too few victories—but also demanded that citizens should not be allowed to own lands beyond the town's defense perimeter, because such possessions frequently involved the town in feuds. Enforcement of such a rule would have meant the abandonment of, among others, all the private holdings in Lauenburg.[32]

The stunned council returned with equally extensive responses, naturally justifying their policies and stewardship, and claiming that their "ancestors" (i.e., previous councils) had incurred the major portion of the debt. Clearly communication was not being served by the town policy of keeping financial affairs in total secrecy, and thus, not surprisingly, the next demand of the Sixty was for the council to open the books. The council agreed to allow citizen representatives to examine some of the records. Furthermore, when at roughly the same time the council filled its vacancies, one of the most vocal Sixty members was among the four men chosen for councillor.[33] But the citizens were not satisfied, although after their inspection of finances some complaints were dropped. The representatives had found that 71,080 marks of the annuity debt came from sales of the last twelve years. This was an enormous sum, perhaps equal to four or five years' income for the town, an amount which later would have sufficed to support Lubeck's participation in the Hansa wars with Denmark for six years. Fritz Rörig has estimated its modern purchasing power at around one million pounds sterling.[34] Combined with recent excessive military expenditures—the "Wendish wars," for example, had cost roughly six times the original estimate—this meant that the bulk of the town's burden stemmed not from profligate "ancestors" but rather from these very councillors. The Sixty agreed to some new taxation, but only on the condition of more citizen participation in government, specifically continued existence of their committee and the installation of two citizen assistants for each of the four major administrative officers. The council grudgingly

[32] There were apparently nearly 100 specific articles of complaint according to C **26**: p. 390. The complaints, however, must be reconstructed from the council's answers to them in C **26**: pp. 393–406 and from the complaints of 1407 (recorded after 1408), LUB **5**: no. 188, in which many items were repeated. The defense perimeter (*Landwehr*) to which the complaint referred was a moat planted with shrubbery (using rivers and creeks where possible) which had been established between 1303 and 1316; see Fink, 1953: pp. 255–258 and maps, and Hartwig, 1908: pp. 209–218. According to the map in Schulze, 1957, and to Düker, 1932: pp. 21ff., private holdings outside this line must have involved at least sixteen entire villages in Lauenburg alone. Note also that territorial policy was clearly an issue between the citizens and council of Rostock at about the same time; see below, section 6, and Fritze, 1967*b*: p. 57.

[33] Johan Schotte, C **26**: pp. 388–392. It seems possible that all four were chosen with an eye to citizen reaction; at any rate, when events came to a head in 1408, only one of these, Hermen Westval, became an exile, and he only late in 1408 after aiding the transfer of authority to the new council. He also returned well before the other exiles, in 1413 or 1414; see note 85 below.

[34] C **26**: pp. 406–408; LUB **5**: nos. 157 and 184. In the latter document, the treasurer's account for a one-year period shows an income of 14,740 marks, but considers this figure incomplete. Fritze, 1961*b*: p. 84 notes that Lubeck spent 78,792 marks on the war with Denmark over a seven-year period (1426–1433). Rörig's estimate is in 1967: p. 163.

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agreed, at Easter, 1406, and the crisis seemed to have passed.[35]

At the Easter meeting a year later, however, the council suddenly announced that the town's financial situation had improved so spectacularly under the new arrangement that the Sixty and the citizen administrative overseers could be dismissed, although the council would in the future consult with the aldermen of the guilds and merchant societies before going to war or taking on a major debt. The dubious committee responded that in fact many problems still remained, and compiled some eighteen points on which they were still not satisfied. This document, to the modern reader, seems to be calling for a change in priorities. If summarized, the specific charges seem to claim that the council had neglected and mismanaged internal affairs, and in foreign policy had been more concerned with acquiring territory than promoting commerce. The Sixty asserted that the council had failed to preserve all of the privileges and freedoms of the town; had failed to protect citizens from piracy in the Baltic and North Seas; had overextended itself by allowing citizens and even councilmen to hold landed estates outside the defense perimeter. At least seven military actions had been ill-conceived, ill-executed, and/or far too costly. Poor planning in the treasury had led to the sale of far too many annuities, and no more should be sold without citizen consent until the debt was resolved. The council had mismanaged the town mint, the wine cellar, and the hospital and chapel for which it was steward. It had casually made major loans to other towns without a thought for the future tax burdens this would cause. Thus government solely by council had been misdirected, expensive, and ineffective, more than sufficient grounds for a change in that government. The success of citizen participation was, they concluded, a reason to make the assistants and the Sixty a permanent feature of the town constitution, with the Sixty having a voice in the selection of councillors.[36]

The council resisted this proposal on the grounds of its oath to the emperor and other princes to maintain the existing constitution. Town tensions returned to the level of 1405, and then over the next year grew, as the Sixty plus a new body known as the Citizens' Plenipotentiaries engaged in increasingly more bitter negotiations for constitutional changes. Rumors began to fly: that the council was planning reprisals, in alliance with certain Holstein nobles; that armaments in the city's towers were pointed not outside the walls but inward. Finally in January, 1408, a large and angry crowd threatened to attack the council's annual procession. It held back when the Sixty formed an escort, but then gathered again to besiege both council and Sixty in the town hall. According to the chronicles, eventually a terrified burgomaster said to a committee spokesman "tell them what you will and what you can answer for, but for God's sake quiet them down"; the spokesman then shouted out a window to the crowd, "You will choose the council!" The ensuing celebration gave the parties opportunity to escape, and a number of councillors removed themselves to the distance and safety of Mölln castle. When by the following May negotiations with the remnant of the council had broken down, the citizens' bodies decided to develop a wholly new council and a new constitution.[37] The departed councillors, later joined by another colleague, making their numbers fifteen out of the twenty-three-man council, dispersed to cities where they had relatives or business partners, notably Luneburg, Hamburg, and Bruges.

Information on Lubeck internal affairs becomes rather fragmentary at this point. We do not, for example, know the exact structure of the new Lubeck constitution of April or May, 1408, although probably it resembled one of the Sixty–Plenipotentiary proposals of 1407.[38] Certainly a

[35] C **26**: pp. 406–414. Citizen overseers were installed for the offices of treasury, taxation, master of the wine cellar, and combined market master-administrator of municipal property. Koppmann thinks that the eight overseers collectively formed the "Citizen's Plenipotentiaries" referred to below, a body about which otherwise no information has survived (see C **26**: p. 409 note). The title Plenipotentiaries (C **26**: p. 413, "etlicke borger, volmechtich van der menheit wegen") implies that they had been given full power to perform some function by the community and in its name, so that Koppmann's guess is not an unreasonable one.

[36] LUB **5**: no. 188.

[37] C **26**: pp. 389–392, 414–432; C **28**: pp. 43–46; LUB **5**: no. 190. The burgomaster was Marquart van Dame, the Sixty spokesman the armorer Eler Stange.

[38] The proposals (assumed by some writers to in fact have been the new constitutional arrangement) are LUB **5**: nos. 191, 652. The initial council of May, 1408, was, however, established through a formal and notarized transfer of power, including documents of privilege, seals, etc., in which, with the advice and consent of the bishop of Lubeck, seven existing councillors (of the nine still in Lubeck at that time) selected an "Electoral Committee" of twelve citizens. This electoral committee then chose

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new council was established, and apparently any citizen was eligible to serve on it, a break with the traditions and laws which had always barred artisans. Citizen input into the choice of councillors was provided for, although the precise mechanism for it is uncertain.[39] Citizen committees such as the Sixty were preserved, and a new sixteen-person special Financial Committee was instituted.

For the most part, this new council was, as nearly as can be determined, both moderate and relatively successful. It took power with no violence, no trials or executions; eight of the old council members remained in the city with person and property unscathed. In their efforts to deal with the still-unsolved financial crisis, the new councillors eventually (1411) declared the exiles' property forfeit to the town and then sold it, probably at auction; they also renegotiated terms for a number of annuities.[40] A small amount of citizen dissatisfaction appeared.[41] But on the whole, considering that it had to assume all of the old council's problems with little of its experience, the new citizen-based government acquitted itself well, in internal affairs at least. It was foreign policy that brought them down eight years later, specifically their inability to outmaneuver the exiles at the courts of kings.[42]

Both sides were quick to take advantage of the confused and fragmented political situation. Surprisingly, the initial, if transitory, success went to the new council. On offering to pay imperial duties to Rupert, elector Palatine, "King of the Romans" (uncrowned emperor) since the deposition of Wenceslas, the new regime was officially recognized by Rupert in August of 1408. The exiles, however, quickly lined up the support of major Hanseatic towns and then made their own offer to Rupert, who retracted his recognition by October and then began a series of hearings.[43] The new council then turned to efforts to win friends for itself among seaport towns. It sent aid to Hamburg and the Wendish towns in an expedition against pirates, and in 1409 dispatched embassies to Rostock and Wismar to plead for their support.[44] Whatever the effect of these embassies—after 1416 the men in them were judged by the Hansa to be "outside agitators" who exported the uprising to those towns—by November, 1409, Wismar and Rostock had developed Citizens' Committees (of 100 in Wismar, sixty in Rostock) and supported the new Lubeck regime. Hamburg followed suit with a Committee of Sixty and some support by May, 1410.[45] All these gains were counterbalanced by the success of the exiles with Rupert, who in January, 1410, completely reversed himself and declared the new Lubeck council and all Lubeck citizens who supported it imperial outlaws.[46]

For various reasons the full effect of the imperial ban was not felt in Lubeck until some time afterward. The early 1400's were of course a time of multiple popes as well as multiple claimants to the emperorship, and the Lubeck council took advantage of this, obtaining a decree that the imperial ban was null and void from the Pisa pope John XXIII.[47] Then shortly thereafter Rupert died, and as Sigismund of Hungary, Jobst of Brandenburg and Moravia, and the persistent Wenceslas all jockeyed for position, Lubeck was able to reach a kind of peaceful coexistence with many of its immediate neighbors. But during the same period, exile leaders visited the Hanseatic

twelve councillors; the twelve new councillors, finally, chose to themselves twelve additional councillors (from which members of the electoral committee were not excluded). See C **26**: pp. 429–432. The reason for this complicated arrangement, in addition to providing citizen input on the choice of councillors, seems to have been that, while both the citizens and the seven councillors agreed that some orderly and legal transfer of power should take place, so that Lubeck would not appear "lawless" and its enemies claim that its rights were invalid, the seven existing councillors were unwilling to declare their colleagues' seats vacant and themselves choose councillors directly.

[39] Note the recognition of citizen selection of councillors in the imperial privilege (later retracted; see below), LUB **5**: no. 215. The electoral committee, the device used in May, 1408 (note 38 above), may have continued to exist for this purpose, although there is no evidence for that. Certainly, however, the Sixty continued to exist and function throughout the 1408–1416 period (LUB **5**: nos. 260, 582–588, 667 etc.), and it presumably still had the power to call citizen assemblies. A Committee of Sixteen, apparently identical with the Financial Committee, also existed through those years (LUB **5**: no. 530). There was no lack of institutions which could have been used for citizen input into the selection of councillors.

[40] LUB **5**: nos. 349, 352, 355, 396, 673, 674.

[41] LUB **5**: nos. 491, 495.

[42] See the works cited in note 4 above and Pitz, 1959: pp. 292–297.

[43] LUB **5**: nos. 203, 215, 217–220, 222, 228, 233, 240–242, 659, 660. C **28**: pp. 54–56. The old council had never recognized Rupert and had withheld the duties.

[44] HR **5**: nos. 527, 530; **6**: no. 397. C **28**: pp. 48–51.

[45] LUB **5**: nos. 317–318. HR **5**: nos. 626, 720. Compare Czok, 1963: pp. 103–106.

[46] LUB **5**: nos. 274, 278, 298–299, 308.

[47] LUB **5**: nos. 328–329. Rupert adhered to Gregory XII.

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factory at Bruges and demanded that it and the Duke of Burgundy appropriate over 250,000 guilders' worth of property from Lubeck citizens, to be given to the exiles in compensation for the damages and confiscations they had suffered from the "outlaws." In the event no goods actually changed hands, but the threat was enough to make the Bruges factory a bitter opponent of the new Lubeck council.[48] Once Sigismund was in control of the throne he initially showed every sign of enforcing Rupert's ban, so that by April, 1412, the Hanseatic diet felt obliged to shut the new regime of its chief city out of its meetings and to consider expelling Lubeck from the League if the ban was not lifted.[49] Nevertheless, Sigismund's main concern, like that of his predecessor, was with possible contributions to the royal purse. Throughout the 1412–1415 period the official hearings kept being postponed, while Lubeck cemented its alliance with the seaport towns. Our first clue to a change of heart is when we find the exiles shunted off for their dealings to Sigismund's queen, Barbara.[50] It seems that Sigismund had decided simply to sell recognition to the highest bidder.

In July, 1415, Sigismund issued secret decrees lifting the ban on Lubeck and restoring Lubeck's imperial privileges to the new council. These letters were then pawned to the Lubeck council for 25,000 Rhenish guilders. Lubeck, in turn, agreed to keep the decrees secret until the spring of 1416, at which time Sigismund could redeem them in Bruges by repaying the money; if he failed to pay, they could be made public.[51] Presumably this unusual arrangement gave any other interested parties time to raise and deliver a larger sum to Sigismund, which he could then use to reclaim the decrees.

The exiles, when they learned of this transaction, turned for aid to a potentially far more dangerous monarch, Eric of Pomerania, king of the Hansa's "traditional enemy," Denmark, as well as of Norway and Sweden, and sole ruler of those three kingdoms since the death of Margaret in 1412. The grounds for enlisting Eric's judgment were thin; certainly he had no legal authority over the dispute as the German king or even conceivably the Hansa did. The exiles were apparently willing to risk the danger he could pose to Lubeck and the entire Hansa in order to regain their rule over the town. The exiles asserted to him that the new council, when meeting with Sigismund, had, along with their persuasive supply of guilders, bolstered their case by emphasizing Eric's designs on Holstein, representing him as a land-hungry monarch eager to tear Lubeck away from the empire. At length the exiles managed to convince Eric not only that he had been defamed, but that Lubeck was allied with his enemy the young Henry III of Holstein in the struggle for Schleswig. Although the new council denied the charges, the greatly angered Eric launched a series of moves designed to thwart Lubeck's commerce, culminating in imprisonment of Lubeck merchants at Scania just as the herring began to run. At the same time he endeavored to ally himself with Sigismund (who eventually recognized Eric's rights over Schleswig in 1424) and to supply him with the funds he needed to redeem the letters of privilege at Bruges.[52]

The Hanseatic League was at this point on the verge of falling into ruin. Two towns critical to its trade routes, Lubeck and Hamburg, plus the major Wendish towns Rostock and Wismar, stood outside the League; Danes were arresting Lubeck merchants at its principal commercial fishing ground, an implied threat to all Baltic commerce; a hostile alliance was in the making which could trap the Hansa towns in a vise, with the Danish monarch on one side of them and the German king on the other. Realizing their position, the remaining Hansa towns now moved quickly to take charge of the situation. For its part, the Lubeck council fully appreciated the desperate nature of its plight following the Danish intervention, and was now willing to cooperate. Several towns served as arbitrators, and hammered out a compromise settlement between the hostile Lubeck groups which included an award of 60,000 guilders (about 55,000 marks) in damages to the exiles. There

[48] LUB **5**: no. 357; **6**: no 796. HR **5**: nos. 720, 729; **6**: nos. 35, 50.

[49] LUB **5**: nos. 398–401, 410, 413, 420. HR **6**: no. 68. Actual expulsion seems never to have occurred.

[50] LUB **5**: nos. 317–318, 493, 525.

[51] LUB **5**: nos. 531–536, 541, 575, 601. C **28**: pp. 64–68. It seems that Lubeck made only an initial 8,000 to 9,000 guilder installment on their bribe; in any case, even after the return of the old council, Sigismund claimed that Lubeck owed him 16,000 guilders. Eventually, as part of the settlement, a deal was struck whereby Sigismund forgave the "debt" but Lubeck was judged to be 13,000 guilders in arrears in its imperial duties. LUB **5**: nos. 618–620, 623; **6**: no. 1.

[52] LUB **5**: nos. 550, 565, 568–570, 592, 601. HR **6**: nos. 246, 252. C **28**: pp. 72–74. Niitemaa, 1960: pp. 96–200 provides an extensive analysis of the relations between the German and Danish monarchies in this period and concludes (pp. 120–133) that it was the united action of Sigismund and Eric which forced the settlement of 1416.

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were a few dissenters, but finally in 1416 a ceremony marked the restoration of peace in Lubeck.[53] Hansa delegates then turned to suppress the citizens' committees in Rostock and Hamburg, while the Duke of Mecklenburg did the same in Wismar. Once this was accomplished, the Hansa then with considerable difficulty managed to pacify both Sigismund and Eric. By 1418 a Hanseatic diet at Lubeck considered that normal conditions had been restored, although it was careful to adopt a statute condemning revolt in any of its member towns. Henceforth agitation for an uprising in a Hansa town would be punished by death, and any town which altered or restricted its council would be expelled from the League.[54]

However, although both the town and the League wished to create the impression that the crisis had been survived without effect and the *status quo ante* had returned, such was not the case. In Lubeck, although the citizen committees were gone, and all the still-living members of the old council regained their seats, politics had changed. The settlement was not a restoration, but rather a compromise. The official document from it offers clues to this, as it refers to new councillors as well as old with such titles as "honorable lords," and at one point specifically mentions that the arbitrators refused to judge which of the councils was better than the other. The extent of the compromise is clearly defined by council membership rolls: overall, the post-1416 council of twenty-seven men contained ten persons who had been in exile, but also nine who had actively supported the new council, as well as eight men who were presumably "neutral," i.e., had neither left Lubeck nor joined a council or committee of the new regime.[55] Numerically, at least, the bitterest opponents and the strongest supporters of the uprising were roughly in balance. This balance was clearly intended in the settlement: of the thirteen men which it added to the pre-1408 councillors, eight were proponents of the uprising whereas only one was an exile. It is also worth noting that of the remaining four men added in 1416, only one came from a former council family, while one was the nephew of a Committee of Sixty member.

Further, exile strength shrank from then on. No additional councillors were selected until 1426, although ten died in the interim; this presumably reflects inability of the factions to agree.[56] Then in each of the next two selections of councillors (1426 and 1428)—as if by plan—a former exile, a former proponent, three probable "neutrals," and two men who were probably sympathetic to the uprising (based on their actions during the period or their family relationships) were chosen.[57] With these additions plus a differential death rate, by 1428 former proponents of the uprising outnumbered exiles on the council, and the six remaining exiles were dwarfed by the total of twenty-three councillors who had never gone into exile.

Looking at council rolls another way, of the thirty-nine men who were newly chosen for councillor between 1416 and 1450, only four were exiles; another two were sons of exiles, for a total of six, or just over 15 per cent, from this one-time majority of the council. During the same period eleven proponents (28 per cent) joined the council, as well as three sons of proponents and three others probably sympathetic to the uprising; thus perhaps as many as 44 per cent of the councillors added in the period had given some degree of support to the new regime. Of

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[53] See note 79 below.

[54] LUB **5**: nos. 562, 574, 577, 580–588, 592, 601–602, 618–620, 623. HR **6**: nos. 262, 285–290. C **28**: pp. 79–86, 363–367. Niitemaa, 1960: pp. 133–140.

[55] See LUB **5**: no. 583. As the documents in C **26**: pp. 433–434, list only five men specifically as coming to the restored council from the new council, historians have failed to note the full extent of this compromise, and have generally considered the settlement virtually a complete victory for the exiles, e.g., Wehrmann, 1878: p. 147, followed by almost all since, including Dollinger, 1970: pp. 288–289. However, these five (Lodwich Crull, Johan van Hervorde, Bertelt Rolant, Tideman Steen, Detmer van Tunen) distinguished in documents were in all likelihood only those who were actually sitting on the new council in 1416. In any case, four others (Johan Bere, Cort Brekewolt, Johan van Hamelen, Johan Schonenberch) had at one time or another appeared on either the new council or a citizen committee. See also notes 58 and 85 below.

[56] The number of councillors in Lubeck often fluctuated, but never to this degree; seventeen men (as was the case in late 1425) is the smallest council in the entire 1360–1450 period, and this was almost immediately followed by the largest council of that entire period, twenty-nine men (in 1428). It is probably more than just coincidence that no new councillors were chosen until after the death of the burgomaster and principal exile leader Jordan Pleskow in October, 1425.

[57] Both Jacob Bramstede (1426–1455) and Kersten van Rentelen (1426–1431) had carried money and goods to Rostock for the new council in 1415; *Niederstadtbuch III*, in the Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck, p. 660 (hereinafter abbreviated Nsb). Van Rentelen was also the son of a possibly "pro-citizen" burgomaster; see note 102 below. Johan Colman (1428–1454, burgomaster from 1443) and Johan Luneborch (1428–1461, burgomaster from 1449) were sons of the proponents of the same names.

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the remainder, the sixteen apparent "neutrals," at least four had marriage ties to councillors of the uprising years.[58] One may conclude that after 1416 supporters of the uprising came to have considerable political influence, while the exiles, those who had once dominated the council, found their power greatly diminished.

Outside the walls, too, there were changes. In 1409 Eric IV of Saxony-Lauenburg had attacked Mölln, and although the new council had defended it, they eventually had found it necessary to grant Eric more than half the tolls from the canal, plus the full responsibility to "protect" commerce, to win peace. The post-settlement council repudiated this treaty, but waited to act until it had secured an alliance with Hamburg. The campaign of the two towns against the new duke Eric V in 1420 regained most of the lands and rights lost since 1400, but the castle and bailiwick of Bergedorf was now a joint holding of both Lubeck and Hamburg. All this implies that Lubeck had decided that it could not afford to defend so much territory by itself, an impression which seems confirmed by further joint campaigns with Hamburg in the area in following years. In any case, from this point on Lubeck made no significant new territorial gains, and was often on the defensive in holding its existing lands and rights. Further, there were virtually no new acquisitions of estates by individual citizens after 1416. Lubeck's territorial expansion was, most observers agree, at an end.[59] Or, to borrow Fritze's phrase, Lubeck's power on the land had reached its "turning point."

Such wording recalls the discussion of the problems of the Hanseatic League. Given the key place which Lubeck held in the League, certainly any weakness there would have had a broader effect. In fact, if one is inclined to look for a single event that might mark the "turning point" in the fortunes of the Hansa, then, while certainly there are other candidates, one could do worse than cite the Lubeck uprising of 1408. It takes just a bit of imagination to see the uprising as the first in a long chain of events stretching to mid-century in which the Hansa slowly lost power to Denmark and the Dutch. Eric's attack on Lubeck was the first openly hostile act by Denmark against a Hansa town since the Peace of Stralsund, but it was far from the last. It may be that Lubeck's rapid collapse had given him just the encouragement he needed to pursue a more aggressive policy. After 1416 he was in the enviable position of knowing that the chief councillors of Lubeck—the functioning heads of the Hansa—owed their position to Danish intervention. In any case, Eric in 1417 began to apply the same tactics against all the Hanseatic towns which he had used successfully against Lubeck, interfering with their commerce at Scania, Malmo, Oslo, and other points. By 1422 he had increased the toll charges at Scania and even declared his right to take tolls on the Sound as well. In the same period he began to promote native Danish merchant activity and to encourage the English and Dutch to visit Bergen and Scania. By 1426 the Danes and the Hansa were at war again. The Hansa towns could still assemble strong military forces, and so, although the first phase of the war ended in a crushing Hansa defeat in 1427, by 1435 the towns had forced Eric out of Schleswig and to the peace table. Nevertheless the victory was transitory at best. The war had publicly displayed League disunity, as during it the Prussian and Livonian towns had refused to join in the fighting, and even the participation of some Wendish towns had been doubtful practically to the last minute. The Danish tolls at the Sound were not removed,

[58] The only exiles who became councillors (as opposed to those already councillor before 1408) were Diderik Morkerke, Johan Klingenberch, Bruno Warendorp, and Wilhelm van Calve. Jordan Pleskow the younger and Johan Westval were sons of exiles. In the same period the one-time proponents Johan Bere, Lodwich Crull, Johan van Hamelen, Johan van Hervorde, Bertelt Rolant, Johan Schonenberch, Tideman Steen, Detmer van Tunen, Hinrik Schenkinch, Johan Hoveman, and Kersten Ekhof all joined the council. Reckoned here as probably sympathetic are, in addition to those cited in note 57 above, Johan Gerwer (1416–1460; nephew of Sixty member Hinrik Gerwer) and Bertolt Witick (1439–1474, burgomaster from 1457, son of Sixty and new council member Hans Witick). Those tied by marriage include Albert Arp (1416–1436), who married the sister of new councillor Johan van der Heide; Clawes Robele (1428–1433) the widow of Hermen van Alen: Tideman Soling (1428–1436) the daughter of Hinrik Honerjäger; Gert van Minden (1433–1462, burgomaster from 1454) the daughter of Detmer van Tunen.

[59] LUB **5**: nos. 294–297. C **26**: pp. 437–440; C **28**: pp. 50, 139–144, 371–372. See Düker, 1932: especially pp. 22–46, and Hoffman, 1889: pp. 151–152. Schulze, 1957: pp. 98–153 feels that Lubeck's territorial policy, at least in Lauenburg, continued to be aggressive, expansionist, and largely successful until at least the 1470's; thus he takes issue with Düker. This conclusion, however, rests primarily on the assumption that the newly founded cloister in Marienwohlde functioned, in terms of land acquisition, as an arm of the town and citizens of Lubeck, a defensible but by no means certain interpretation. Otherwise new acquisitions by the town council were few, and (as even Schulze admits) by citizens virtually nonexistent, after 1420. Compare the other works cited in note 19 above.

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and in fact would remain in force for over 400 years; theoretically the Hansa towns had won exemption from paying them, but as time went on this seems to have been honored as much in the breach as in the observance. Nor did the victory ensure even the future of the Holstein portage for more than a generation, since both Schleswig and Holstein passed to the Danish crown as the inheritance of Christian of Oldenburg in 1460.[60]

Moreover, if the real purpose of the 1426–1435 conflict had been to keep the Baltic a Hanseatic lake, then the Hansa, while winning a "battle," had begun to lose the true "war." With the German towns his enemies, Eric turned ever closer to the Dutch, and during the war they supplied Scandinavia with provisions, gaining not only the profits which might have gone to Hanseatic merchants, but also even better knowledge of Danish waters as they ran the League's blockade of the Sound. The defeat of Denmark only cemented this tacit Danish-Dutch alliance, and encouragement of the Hollanders became the cornerstone of Danish economic policy for the rest of the century. Open war between the Hansa and the Dutch between 1438 and 1441 resulted only in equal rights for both in Denmark and a treaty of reciprocity between Dutch and Wendish merchants. From that point on, Holland's share of the northern trade continuously increased while the Hansa's sank.[61] If the Lubeck uprising had indeed opened the door for the Danish wars, then that was a door which led to both political and economic regression for the League.

But, whether or not one finds such reasoning convincing, no such complicated linkage is necessary to show a relationship between the Lubeck uprising of 1408 and the decline of the Hansa. The events of the uprising can in fact be easily tied to each of the four major factors in that decline which were outlined above. During the 1408–1416 period when the League was, in effect, "headless" and Lubeck's merchants found their rights in question, the Dutch were quick to take advantage; it seems to have been just at this time that significant numbers of merchants from Holland first appeared in Livonia, and certainly they were able to expand their share of Baltic trade in Lubeck's partial absence.[62] The political complications of the uprising clearly revealed how vulnerable the Hansa was to territorial rulers: its own sovereign took little interest in its problems except as a source of money for him, while the King of Denmark managed with a few imprisonments to accomplish what the towns had been unable to do for eight years, namely spurring the parties to come to terms. When Wismar, Rostock, and Hamburg followed Lubeck's lead, in spite of imperial outlawry and League disapproval, it demonstrated once again the difficulty of maintaining Hanseatic solidarity. Finally, while one can debate whether the exiled Lubeck councillors truly deserve Fritze's appellation of "reactionary" or even to be called "conservative," certainly they exhibited something less than self-sacrificial statesmanship in their willingness to involve strong Hansa enemies like the Duke of Burgundy and especially the King of Denmark in their own local struggle.

In short, the uprising of 1408 both reversed a pattern of the expansion of Lubeck's influence and pointed out major weaknesses in the Hansa as a whole. Thus it at least illustrates, if it did not also help to define, the limits which existed for northern towns seeking "city-state" power, either individually or collectively. It therefore seems important not only for social history, but for the history of both urban development and the Hanseatic League, to determine what forces were expressed in the uprising, to what extent the issues were economic failures, social tensions, or political problems.

3. SOCIOECONOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE MOVEMENT

A century ago Carl Wehrmann concluded that the Lubeck uprising of 1408, like its predecessors of 1376–1384, was essentially "democratic" or "popular": an artisan protest against patrician monopoly of the town council. More recent work by Fritz Rörig, Edmund Cieslak, and others has altered some of the details in Wehrmann's portrait of the uprising, but has not significantly questioned his social analysis. If this was an artisan rising, then it could be placed in company with many

[60] The account here and below owes most to Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 180–246, 250–251. See also Dollinger, 1970: pp. 295–297, and more specifically, on the Schleswig question Niitemaa, 1960: especially pp. 121–200; on the Sound, Hill, 1926: especially pp. 3–31. Eric's interference with Hanseatic commerce in 1417 may be seen in HR **6**: nos. 386, 387, 433; the most important sources for his later acts are HR **7**: nos. 538 and 550; **8**: nos. 35 and 760. The exact date when tolls at the Sound were first collected is unknown.

[61] Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 247–250; Dollinger, 1970: pp. 295–297; Vollbehr, 1930: pp. 36 ff. In this context note also Winter, 1948, and Spading, 1970.

[62] Vollbehr, 1930: pp. 28–29; Dollinger, 1970: p. 295.

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examples of urban unrest in the same time period throughout Europe. In most towns craftsmen were required to pay taxes, but barred from political participation. In addition, some authors have suggested that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries certain trades—those requiring little initial capital, such as those of the butchers or textile workers—were under severe competition from former peasants driven into town by the agricultural crisis. Lubeck's "Butchers' Rising" of 1384, extensively studied by Ahasver von Brandt, was a conspiracy centered in the butchers' guild, with some support from others, and many of the conspirators seem to have fallen on hard economic times. Most students of the 1408 uprising presume that it was a somewhat more broadly based example of a similar phenomenon. Such revolts sometimes found support among the lesser merchants, whose wealth and income approximated that of the upper artisans, and Cieslak, for example, considers it probable that in 1408 such small merchants appeared in greater numbers than previously. Nevertheless there has been little dispute of the evaluation that the inspiration for, and leadership of, the uprising came from craftsmen, as a challenge to the patrician rule of the town, a challenge to government by and for the great merchants and property owners. The presence of artisans on the 1408–1416 councils in defiance of law and tradition, and the difficulties between the new regime and the merchant Hansa, are considered supportive of this interpretation.[63] Thus, while most authors would not describe the uprising precisely as a "class struggle," this approach gives it something of the character of a social movement: high taxes triggered the expression of long-smoldering resentments felt by those outside the topmost levels of society and excluded from government.

A number of problems with this approach, however, emerge on closer investigation. For example, all sources describe the proponents of the uprising as not just artisans but "citizens" or "the community," terms which normally were used only when persons above artisan status were included. One chronicle specifically identifies both merchants and holders of annuities, as well as craftsmen, among groups and persons supporting the uprising.[64] There is the further problem of whether a regime based primarily on artisans, after eight years of survival, would have collapsed so quickly in the face of Danish intervention—a blow primarily to commerce and thus to merchant, not artisan, incomes. Obviously the men who remained on the council after 1416 were not artisans. On the other hand, if councillors were "patricians," then it would appear that the movement was not thoroughly anti-patrician. As we have seen, the uprising was not directed against the entire town council; while about two-thirds of the council went into exile, a remainder stayed in Lubeck and joined none of the exiles' protests. In fact, recent work has challenged whether a true patriciate even existed in Lubeck or other Hanseatic seaport towns.[65] Clearly one can question both parts

[63] See for example Wehrmann, 1878 (who admits of almost no merchant participation), and Cieslak, 1954; Dollinger, 1970: pp. 132–134, 160–161, 286–291; Rörig, 1971: pp. 160, 672–673. However, on the general problem of actually establishing artisan responsibility for uprisings see Rotz, 1976. (The excellent study of 1384 by von Brandt, 1959, however, certainly does; see note 5 above.)

[64] Note for example that in C **26** the discontented citizens of summer 1405 are "menheid" (p. 386), "borger mit den amten thosamende" (p. 386), "de menen borger und amte" (p. 387). When the Sixty appeared, the chronicle reports that "de gantze menheit, borger und amte, hedden se 60 dar tho voget" (p. 388); an assembly in support of the Sixty is described as "de gantze menheit van Lubek, beyde junge lude und olde, de kopman und alle amte, grot und luttich" (p. 388). When the Sixty delivered their initial complaints, it was, according to the chronicle, with the full support of all corporations and merchant associations as well as guilds: "alle nacien van jungen luden, van rentenern, van allen copluden und van allen amten en bevolen hadden" (p. 390). Such phrases appear in several spots. It is virtually impossible that a literary source of this period would have given proponents of an uprising higher status than that to which they were entitled; usually such sources underrated them. See Menke, 1958–1960; Rotz, 1976, and 1973*b*: pp. 70–73.

[65] A major portion of the problem with "patricians" is semantics. Only a very few towns (e.g., Nuremberg) actually codified a legal principle that restricted public office to certain families, and yet that is the only definition of "patrician" which is generally accepted. For most towns scholars can describe exactly the same levels of wealth, intermarriage, and admission of new families into government, but while one will conclude that this identifies the patriciate another will use precisely the same evidence to deny the existence of one. For example, Dollinger, 1970, bases his description of the patriciate in Hanseatic seaport towns (pp. 132–136; see also pp. 169–179) largely on the work of Ahasver von Brandt and Heinrich Reincke, both of whom reject use of the term "patrician" in their towns. Their strongest "anti-patrician" sentiments are in von Brandt, 1966 and Reincke, 1956. The same confusion reigns among Marxists. Berthold, Engel, and Laube, 1973, have triggered a heated debate about the use of such terms as *Klasse, Schicht,* and *Stand,* in which the patrician concept figures prominently; see *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* **21** (1973): pp. 196–217, 443–444; **22** (1974): pp. 331–337, 605–615. In this context see also the essay by Ehbrecht, 1974*b*. The specific problems

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of the traditional interpretation, i.e., whether the uprising was basically an artisan movement, and whether it was directed at the "patriciate."

It is precisely with such problems that prosopography as a method can be helpful. For this investigation biographical profiles were sought for 259 citizens of Lubeck, including both supporters and opponents of the uprising, as well as Lubeck councillors over a ninety-year time span. Useful social, economic, and/or genealogical information was found for 257 of them.[66] The following information and analysis are based on these profiles.

First let us consider the question of whether the forces in Lubeck which established citizen committees and a new council were primarily artisan. Several documents make it possible to obtain the names of 105 persons who at one time or another supported the uprising, including lists of members of citizens' committees and most, if not all, of the new councillors of 1408–1416.[67]

Citizens first expressed themselves institutionally with the Committee of Sixty, and a list of members of that committee survives, unfortunately undated, but probably from 1407 or early 1408.[68] Of the persons on that list whose profession can be identified, sixteen were artisans: three brewers (one of whom was also an innkeeper), two goldsmiths, two butchers, two cobblers, and one each from the trades of amber-worker, armorer, baker, hatter, pursemaker, smith, and tanner. However, these artisans were outnumbered by better than two to one by those for whom either proof of merchant activity or of membership in a commercial association could be found. The Committee of Sixty included at least thirty-four merchants, among them thirteen textile merchants, ten engaged in trade with Flanders, three drapers, and ten members of merchants' associations like the Travelers to Scania (*Schonenfahrer*) and Travelers to Bergen (*Bergenfahrer*).[69] Of the ten persons for whom no profession could be definitely established, five were probably merchants. Thus

relating to the Lubeck patriciate, or lack of one, will be dealt with below in section 4.

[66] The realm of persons for whom information was sought includes 105 supporters of the uprising and thirty-seven men in exile during the uprising, plus, for comparative and analytical purposes, a sample of forty-five men apparently in the elite who did not go into exile (future councillors and Circle Society members; see section 4 and note 87 below) and the 127 known Lubeck councillors who served between 1360 and 1408 or between 1416 and 1450. Duplications of persons within this realm included two supporter-exiles (notes 74 and 76 below), nineteen exile-councillors, thirteen supporter-councillors, and twenty-one non-exile-councillors, leaving a total of 259 persons. Only two persons could not be satisfactorily identified (note 77 below).

The complete profiles, with full documentary citations for each individual, are in Rhiman A. Rotz, "Profiles of Selected Lubeck Citizens 1360–1450" (1975), a typewritten manuscript deposited with the Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck. The source base for these investigations may be found in section I of the Bibliography for the present work. It includes such copies from town books and citizen wills as remain in that archive, notably the remarkable *Personenkartei* (see von Brandt, 1960, for an evaluation of these sources), as well as published collections of chronicles and documents. Evidence of merchant activity was extracted from these and from the poundage books of Hamburg, Lubeck, and Reval, as well as from secondary works containing excerpts from or based on documents now lost. Note: in all cases where the extent of property holdings changed during the individual's lifetime, the maximum holdings at any one time in each of the major categories, rural and urban, were used for the computations which follow.

[67] Principal sources of names are, for the Sixty, C **26**: p. 393; for the negotiators and electors of January-May, 1408, C **26**: pp. 429–433, and LUB **5**: no. 190; for the Sixteen, C **26**: pp. 422–423 (1408), and LUB **5**: no. 530 (1415). Most councillors are in Fehling, 1925, supplemented here by entries from Nsb. Some other documents issued by committees or groups yield names of a few of their members, e.g., LUB **5**: nos. 260, 541, 667, and of course there are those mentioned in the chronicle accounts cited in note 31 above.

[68] Koppmann dated it by assumption to October 27, 1405, the date when the Sixty was first formed. This early a date, however, is unlikely, since the list does not include the name of Johan Schotte, who according to the chronicle (C **26**: pp. 388–392) was a Sixty member then and until at least early April, 1406; he was chosen for the council sometime thereafter in 1406. On the other hand, the list does include Hinrik upme Orde and Siverd Vockinghusen, who, as will be discussed below, notes 74 and 76, left Lubeck in late 1409 or 1410 (LUB **5**: nos. 263, 491; HR **5**: no. 680). Thus this list must date from some point between the spring of 1406 and 1410. The most logical point in that period was May, 1408, when notaries recorded every step of the transfer of power. The list of electors (C **26**: p. 432) certainly dates from then, and considering their similar form as published by Koppmann (the originals are lost) the lists of both the Sixty (p. 393) and the Sixteen (pp. 422–423) may also. Note: one name on this list was illegible to Koppman and could not be traced; Schotte, however, is included in the following analysis.

[69] On the important Lubeck merchant societies/companies of the *Schonenfahrer* (probably better translated "sailors" to Scania, but here "Travelers" to avoid confusion with ship captains or boatmen) and the *Bergenfahrer* (Travelers to Bergen), see especially Dollinger, 1970: pp. 162–163; Baasch, 1922; Bruns, 1900. Note that membership in one society did not exclude membership in another, and also that some individuals can be established as, for example, both textile merchants and merchants to Flanders. Hence the specifics above yield more than thirty-four merchants if added.

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it seems likely that the Sixty was about two-thirds merchant and at most about one-third artisan. Among its members were important and respected men, such as three aldermen of the Travelers to Scania and two of the Travelers to Bergen. One even finds several persons who were probably part of Lubeck's elite: seven members of the highly prestigious Circle Society, or Society of the Holy Trinity, to which, for example, over three-quarters of the councillors of 1408 belonged; three sons of former councillors, and an additional four sons-in-law of councillors.[70]

Profession, of course, is not the only, nor necessarily the best, indicator of status. There was, for example, a considerable economic and social gap between a great merchant in Flemish cloth and a merchant who handled a few barrels of Scania herring each year. Fortunately, enough information is available on most individuals to establish some categories for analysis which consider status and wealth as well as profession. These categories are not intended necessarily to correspond to or imply any individual's membership in any coherent social class; they are designed simply to facilitate analysis of the data in somewhat more meaningful social, economic, and political terms, based not on ideal classifications but rather using distinctions which can be made from the available evidence. In the aggregate they should provide an approximation of the socioeconomic composition of the committees and councils.

As an approach to those in, near, or upwardly mobile into the elite, group I includes those who satisfy one or more of the following qualifications: a councillor before 1408 or after 1416; a member of the Circle Society; one related by blood or marriage to such a councillor or member of the Circle Society; or, evidence of a major personal fortune (in the event, a 3,000-mark gift by one individual, landholdings exceeding a village and three manors for two others).[71] Where genealogical data are available, persons were further divided into subgroups: I*a*, for those descended from a councillor or Circle member; I*b*, for those not descended, but themselves a councillor (pre-1408 or post-1416) or Circle member, brother of such a person, or married into a council or Circle family; I*c*, for those who were ancestors of a councillor or Circle member, or of a daughter who married one.

To distinguish those probably outside the elite but still high in wealth and status, group II includes those not qualified for group I but who meet one or more of the following qualifications: evidence of merchant activity or membership in a merchants' association; some investment in rural land; ownership of more than four houses; or, practice of an artisan trade which in Lubeck often engaged in commerce and whose members' wealth tended to be equal to that of a lesser merchant, namely brewers, goldsmiths, or amber-workers.[72]

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[70] The role of the Circle Society (*Zirkel*, after the circular emblem which members wore as a symbol of the Trinity; later also *Jungherren* or *Junker*) in Lubeck's social and political history is a matter of considerable debate and will be discussed further in section 4 below. However, for the purpose of judging the status of certain proponents of the uprising, it is sufficient to note here that all students of the problem agree that members of the Circle were men of very high status, and some use the term "patrician" in Lubeck exclusively for Circle members. See Wehrmann, 1888; Wegemann, 1941; Rörig, 1971: especially pp. 243–244 and note 36; von Brandt, 1966: pp. 231–235. Circle members on the Sixty were Lodwich Crull, Hans Luneborch, Evert Moyelke, Hinrik upme Orde, Johan Perzeval, Johan Schotte, and Siverd Vockinghusen. For the other individual examples used here: Johan Lange, Luneborch, and Perzeval were sons of former councillors. John Crowel, Simon Oldeslo, and Vockinghusen had married daughters of former councillors, and Borcherd van Hildessem was the son-in-law of the sitting councillor Arnd Sparenberch as well as an alderman of the Travelers to Scania. Other merchant alderman were Marquart Schutte and Hermen Vinck (Scania), Johan Grove and Johan van Hamelen (Bergen).

[71] To these and the following standards, note that Ahasver von Brandt, 1966: pp. 226–230, finds that a net worth of about 800 marks was sufficient to put one in the top 19 per cent of Lubeck's taxable population, and that Reincke in the essay "Hamburgische Vermögen 1350–1530" (1951*a*: pp. 201ff.) finds that an estate of 5,000 marks placed one in the elite in Hamburg, a comparable seaport town. Evidence assembled for the present study indicates that the average rural holdings for all councillors who served between 1360 and 1408 were slightly less than one-half village and one manor (0.47 and 0.94 respectively); urban holdings for the same sample averaged 4.95 houses per councillor, plus other property.

The three persons among the proponents admitted under the financial-property qualification to group I are: Werner Hop, who gave 1,000 marks to each of his three sons on the occasion of his remarriage, and probably had an estate well in excess of 5,000 marks; Otto Lenzeke, who held three villages and three manors; Lutke Nyestadt, with a village and three manors. See Rotz, 1975.

[72] "Amber-workers" in Lubeck (*Paternostermacher*) made rosaries fom Baltic amber which were highly prized in other Hansa towns; they might follow their trade into either import or export. Lubeck beer and Lubeck jewelry also had significant export markets. On the placement of amber-workers, brewers, and goldsmiths with merchants, among others von Brandt, 1959 and 1966, shows that economically, at least, these artisans equalled or sur-

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As evidence permitted, these were placed into subgroups II*a*, known merchants, and II*b*, known commercial artisans.

For non-commercial artisans and others, group III includes all remaining persons for whom some evidence is available, with the subgroup III*a* for those who at least owned more than one house, III*b* one house or less.

Table 1 shows the results using these classifications. Fully one-third of the Sixty meet the standards for group I, persons who, while not necessarily "patrician" (if that term can even be applied to Lubeck), were probably in or near the town's elite. Group II includes twenty-nine persons, nearly another half of the Sixty. Less than 20 per cent of the Sixty were at the level of non-commercial artisans, and those were largely solid property owners. Put another way, the Sixty was probably over 60 per cent merchant or above (I plus II*a*), less than 30 per cent artisan or below (II*b* plus III), with 97 per cent of its persons owning more than minimal property (I, II, and III*a*). Ahasver von Brandt's work indicates that those with some interests in commerce, or with comparable incomes from property, tended to have a taxable worth of 600 marks or more and comprised the top 20 to 25 per cent of the taxable population of Lubeck; this would include the elite, virtually all merchants, most brewers, and leading goldsmiths and amber-workers.[73] While the evidence for this study does not permit precise determination of net worth in all cases, groups I and II together include persons practicing these professions and others of comparable wealth and status, and these groups account for over 80 per cent of the Sixty. Any way it is analyzed, the Sixty was dominated by commercial groups, not by artisans; by persons from the upper wealth and income levels, not the lower.

The Sixty, of course, was only the first institution, and the date of the membership list is uncertain. It would still have been possible for those merchants who supported the efforts for lower taxes to have shrunk from the step of establishing their own council and allowing artisans to sit on it, or to have turned away from the regime when it fell under the imperial ban. In fact, there are two documented cases of the latter, both outstanding merchants and Circle Society members. Both had served on the Sixty, and one of them on the Finance Committee as well; nevertheless they left Lubeck in late 1409 or 1410 and secured letters of pardon from the king.[74] Was this a sign of a general retreat by wealthy merchants and men of higher status after 1408?

To deal with this possibility the same analyses were made on the group of persons found on the new council or on a committee between 1408 and 1416. What is immediately apparent is that many of the same individuals from the Sixty reappear in these later lists: eighteen of the merchants, nine of the artisans, three others for a total of thirty, exactly half of the original Sixty. Of the forty-five new names, twenty-four were merchants (including nine definite textile merchants, two drapers, six Travelers to Bergen, and

TABLE 1

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPONENTS OF THE UPRISING

	The Sixty	Lists of 1408–1416	Total
By Group			
I	20 (33%)	33 (44%)	41 (39%)
II	29 (48%)	27 (36%)	44 (42%)
III	11 (18%)	13 (17%)	18 (17%)
Unclassifiable	0	2 (3%)	2 (2%)
By Subgroup			
I*a*	3 (5%)	3 (4%)	5 (5%)
I*b*	10 (17%)	20 (27%)	23 (22%)
I*c*	4 (7%)	6 (8%)	8 (8%)
I—other	3 (5%)	4 (5%)	5 (5%)
II*a*	17 (28%)	14 (19%)	23 (22%)
II*b*	6 (10%)	8 (11%)	12 (11%)
II—other	6 (10%)	5 (7%)	9 (9%)
III*a*	9 (15%)	11 (15%)	14 (13%)
III*b*	2 (3%)	2 (3%)	4 (4%)
Combinations			
I + II*a* (elite, merchants)	37 (62%)	47 (63%)	64 (61%)
II*b* + III (artisans, others)	17 (28%)	21 (28%)	30 (29%)
I + II ("commercial")	49 (82%)	60 (80%)	85 (81%)
I + II + III*a* (investments)	58 (97%)	71 (94%)	99 (94%)

passed many of the lesser merchants. There are several examples of this among persons investigated for this work, e.g. Johan van der Heide, who was both a brewer and a member of the Travelers to Bergen, and whose sister married a councillor; Cort Bloyebom, probably both goldsmith and merchant, able to loan 1,000 marks or more on three different occasions; the amber-worker Johan Plote, who personally loaned up to 550 marks. For the property standards used, see note 71 above.

[73] Von Brandt, "Die gesellschaftliche Struktur des spätmittelalterlichen Lübeck" (1966), pp. 226–230. Classification of each individual in the proponents appears with his profile in Rotz, 1975.

[74] Hinrik upme Orde and Siverd Vockinghusen, LUB 5: nos. 263, 491; HR 5: nos. 680, 682. See also Stieda, 1921; in his introduction to the commercial correspondence of the Vockinghusen brothers, Stieda particularly has suggested the probable turning away of major merchants from the uprising as it became more "radical."

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two Travelers to Scania), while only fourteen were artisans (four goldsmiths, three bakers, two brewers, and one more each from the amber-workers, butchers, leather-workers, smiths, and weavers). Among them were another son of a councillor, a brother of one, two additional sons-in-law of councillors, and seven more Circle Society members.[75] Considering the total group of seventy-five persons who served the new regime, one finds, interestingly enough, that if anything the overall status of the group has increased (table 1). Thirty-three persons, or over 44 per cent of the total, meet the standards for group I; twenty-seven, or 36 per cent, fit group II, with only thirteen, or 17 per cent, in group III. Those probably merchant or above (I plus II*a*) comprise nearly 63 per cent of the total, artisan or below (II*b* plus III) 28 per cent, and again 80 per cent probably had commercial interests (I plus II). Thus while there were a few individual defections, most probably for individual reasons,[76] on the whole there was no "retreat" of merchants or wealthy men from the new council; the same socioeconomic forces supported both the Sixty and the new council.

Analysis of the proponents as a single unit—all persons who appear in documents as serving on or actively supporting the citizen committees or the new council at any time—is therefore clearly justified by the evidence. Of these 105 persons, evidence sufficient to identify and classify them is lacking for only two.[77] Among the proponents were fifty-eight merchants and only thirty men identified as artisans. Using the same classification scheme (table 1), we find 39 per cent of them in group I, 42 per cent in group II, only 17 per cent in group III (with 2 per cent unclassifiable). The probable merchant or above (I plus II*a*) figure is almost 61 per cent, probable artisan or below (II*b* plus III) less than 29 per cent. With 81 per cent of these individuals either in group I or group II, and 94 per cent of them apparently having the wealth to own more than one house (III*a* and above), this was clearly a movement of solid citizens numerically dominated by those with commercial, not craft, interests. Collectively these 105 persons owned twenty-four commercial buildings, twenty-three mansions and sixty apartments,[78] and 312 houses—an average of nearly three houses per person (2.971)—as well as six villages and fourteen and one-half manors in the countryside.

The use of such numbers and percentages, of course, tends to imply rather more precision than

[75] Thomas Perzeval was son of the burgomaster Johan (and brother to the Johan cited in note 70). Hinrik Cropelin was the brother of councillor Claus. Marquart vamme Kyle and Tideman Steen married daughters of councillors. Johan Bere, Cort Brekewolt, vamme Kyle, Perzeval, Bertelt Rolant, Steen, and Detmer van Tunen were all members of the Circle.

[76] The primary motives for Orde and Vockinghusen (note 74) were almost certainly economic. They were partners in a commercial firm with activities in Flanders, the Rhineland, and Italy as well as the entire Baltic, particularly strong in trade between Lubeck and Venice, and thus were hit hard by imperial outlawry. Note for example that Siverd settled for his exile in Cologne, not Hamburg or Luneburg or one of the other towns where the main body of exiles went; in fact, there is no evidence that he associated himself with the principal exiles in any way. Siverd also returned to Lubeck not in 1416 but only in 1420, a move best explained by the king's prohibition of trade with Venice in that year. Both upme Orde and Vockinghusen severely criticized the new Lubeck council after 1410, but almost always because of the effect it was having on their business, or for some other economic problem such as confiscation of their annuities (see, in spite of Stieda's conclusions, the documents in Stieda, 1921: e.g., nos. 25 and 33). Thus both the timing of their exile and their own words indicate that their absence from Lubeck was for economic reasons, not to escape a "radical" regime.

[77] Hinrik Bloyebom was identified as a cousin of the prosperous Cort Bloyebom (note 72), but no evidence related to Hinrik's own wealth or property was found. The other difficulty came from the name "Witte Johan" in LUB **5**: nos. 530, 541. No individual with the surname Johan could be traced; if one considers the possibility of transposition then the problem still is not solved, as the entry could refer either to the glazier Johan Witte or Johan Witte the Traveler to Bergen. See Rotz, 1975.

[78] Among the unusual features of Lubeck were (and in many cases still are) extremely deep lots unbroken by alleys. A single house built through from one street to another was called a "cross house" (*Querhaus*), and probably contained the floor space of three to four average houses. Another type of dwelling, on a corner plus the depth of its lots, was a "corner house" (*Eckhaus*), probably the equivalent of two to three average houses. These large single-family homes were normally residences of the wealthy and have here and below been placed in a single category, loosely translated as "mansions." Other uses of this lot space were to develop outbuildings on it, or to construct multiple-unit dwellings; both of these were generally described in documents as *Bude*, and so they have been taken in a single category here, very loosely translated as "apartments." The pedestrian passageways to these dwelling units often passed under or through the houses which fronted on the street. The surviving examples of these passages and their dwellings in effect around an interior court are one of the most attractive features of modern Lubeck; they were not, however, considered "desirable" residences around 1400, and all the examples of ownership of them in this sample were, as nearly as can be determined, investment property for rental income.

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is justified by the nature of pre-modern data. All these figures should be taken as guidelines to understanding the movement rather than as an exact definition of it. Nevertheless it is reasonable to assert that this was a movement with substantial representation from persons of high wealth and status, in which probably at least three-quarters of the persons supporting the uprising came from the top one-quarter of the town's taxable population.[79]

Generalization about the entire roll of proponents, however, is perhaps not the best way to approach the problem. The movement was an alliance of persons from many social and economic levels. Of the artisans, it is worth noting that substantial representation came from the prosperous and commercially oriented trades: five brewers, five to seven goldsmiths, two amber-workers, and a very wealthy armorer. These professions required major outlays of capital for the necessary tools or raw materials, and suffered little or no competition from peasant immigrants. Thus any possible artisan economic discontent of the time was probably not a significant factor in this uprising. In any case these fifteen individuals seem successful enough: collectively they held a grain warehouse, a mansion and two apartments, a brewery, a butcher shop, a retail store, an inn approximately the size of three houses, two stalls at the town market, thirty-seven houses, two gardens, and outside the wall two fields and a wood. The other artisans—four bakers, three butchers, two cobblers, a hatter-pawnbroker, a leather-worker, a purse-maker, two smiths, a tanner and a weaver—while less prosperous were by no means propertyless. Together with two men whose professions are unknown they comprise the eight-

[79] One must, of course, consider the possibility that the status of those who served on institutions like the council and the Sixty, and thus who appear in documents, may have been somewhat higher than that of the movement as a whole. Certainly such a pattern can be seen again and again in later events, from popular movements to electoral politics, as groups yielded to the desire to be represented by those of the highest status among them. Unfortunately, obviously one cannot trace in documents those who do not appear in documents; one can, however, say with confidence that at the very least, in this movement the presence of merchants and others with commercial interests was substantially more than token. There is also one piece of evidence which might be helpful in evaluating the nature of the movement's support beyond that which can be determined from institutional records. When the settlement of 1416 was reached, there was a small protest against it. Eighteen persons were arrested, all but one identifiable as artisans: HR **6**: no. *262*; LUB **5**: no. 581. At most, five of those arrested had appeared on institutions supporting the movement: a harness-maker (Ludeke van dem Holme, Sixteen in 1415), a butcher (Johan van Lense, Sixty), two goldsmiths (Hermen Poling, Constitutional Committee 1408, burgomaster 1413; Heyno Sobbe, Sixteen in 1408 and again in 1415, elector 1408, councillor 1409–1414), and perhaps a baker (a Clawes Rubow or Rukow, baker, arrested; a "Hans Rubow the baker" was an elector in 1408). See Rotz, 1975. The other identifiable persons, most of whose professions appear in HR **6**: no. *262* itself (four of these can be confirmed from other evidence), included two aldermen of the pursemakers (see also LUB **5**: no. 355, p. 396, no. 581; Nsb, p. 632), two amber-workers (see also LUB **4**: no. 657; **6**: no. 586, **7**: no. 521), a goldsmith, a harness-maker, a weaver, a tinker, a candlemaker, a locksmith, a preparer of small animal pelts (especially squirrel), and a street peddler, probably of dry goods. Of this evidence two things may be said. On the one hand, it seems further proof that there was no significant involvement of non-citizens or the propertyless in this movement, since (with the possible exception of the one unidentified individual) they do not even appear in arrest records. While of course the peltmaker and the peddler were probably on the lower levels of the citizenry, even they would have owned at least either hides and tools or a cart, and the list is dominated by men of substantial crafts, including five commercial guildsmen (three goldsmiths and two amber-workers) and two guild aldermen. On the other hand, certainly the fact of the artisan protest implies that the terms of the settlement were dictated by the merchant element in the movement, and that a segment of the artisans which had supported it, quite faithfully in the cases of Poling and Sobbe, remained dissatisfied with that settlement. But if that is true, then it only tends to confirm the interpretation that the movement at all stages was dominated by merchants and men of higher rank.

A minor note to the problem of the protest may be added. According to chronicles two persons, a baker variously named Hermen or Clawes Rubow, and the aforementioned goldsmith Heyno Sobbe, were executed following their protest in 1416 (C **28**: pp. 80, 363). But no documentary evidence for the executions survives, while several references show that a baker Clawes Rubow, which is definitely the name of the person arrested, lived on in Lubeck until about 1425, although seriously in debt. No arrest record nor any other evidence exists for a Hermen Rubow. See Rotz, 1975. The only documentary clue to possible executions, that Rubow and Sobbe were arrested with the others but do not reappear later swearing peace with them, applies equally well to an otherwise untraceable Klokholt, whom no one has ever claimed was executed: HR **6**: no. *262*, compare p. 210 with pp. 214–215. The remaining fifteen protestors were officially exiled from Lubeck: LUB **5**: no. 581, but at least one, the amber-worker Hartwich Reder, either never left or was later allowed to return to his town and his craft: LUB **6**: no. 586; **7**: no. 521, while another, the purse-maker Hans Ronner, according to entries in the *Personenkartei* owned a house on Braunstrasse continuously from 1414 to 1423. Thus one is forced to question whether either of the punishments, execution or exile, were in fact fully carried out. Only Poling can be definitely established as in exile; see below.

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een persons of group III, who accounted for three mansions and three apartments, five bakeries, two smithies, seven market stalls, thirty-one houses, a garden, and a vacant lot. Individual holdings within the known artisans ranged, for example, from the warehouse, mansion, five houses, and two apartments of the armorer to a butcher with a single dwelling.[80]

A range of wealth also characterizes the merchants and others of higher levels. The forty-one citizens of group I had invested in three warehouses, nine mansions and twenty-three apartments, five bakeries, a brewery, a bathhouse, a pharmacy, a mill, a garden, six market stalls, and 155 houses, plus, outside the walls, five villages, thirteen and one-half manors, a wood, and salt mines at Oldesloe. The twenty-nine non-artisan members of group II add another ten mansions and thirty-two apartments, eighty-nine houses, a garden, a village, a manor, an orchard, and a one-third share of a meadow. Individual holdings here range from an individual, quite possibly a *rentier,* with three villages, three manors, ten houses, and 157 marks in annuities to several small merchants with a single house, for example the one whose widow found it necessary to take his executors to court over two frying pans and a copper kettle. Origins are just as diverse: a son of a Lubeck burgomaster appeared on the Committee of Sixty alongside a fugitive serf.[81]

The same variety in wealth and status appears, as nearly as can be determined, in the leadership of the movement, as a glance at the seven persons who served as burgomaster between 1408 and 1416 will indicate. Hermen van Alen, a merchant to Reval, was the son of a major textile merchant and grandson (through his mother) of a councillor; his sister was married to a councillor in exile. John Lange's lineage is even more impressive: he was the son of a councillor, his mother was the daughter of a councillor, and Johan himself married the daughter of a burgomaster. Lange held both rural and urban properties, including a village, two and one-half manors, eight houses, a bakery, four market stalls, and a warehouse. Another burgomaster for the new regime was Simon Oldeslo; probably a merchant, he had represented the holders of annuities during the transfer of power in 1408. Married to the daughter of a councillor, his sister married to a councillor in exile, Oldeslo owned a bakery and six houses, and left over 100 marks to churches and charities in his will. Tideman Steen, a merchant to all points from Flanders to Russia, Circle Society member, and an extremely wealthy man who owned two mansions and six other houses, served not only the new council but also became a burgomaster of the regular council after the settlement. He commanded the Hanseatic fleet against Denmark in 1427 (and was forced to resign when he was resoundingly defeated).

All four of the above were classified in group I in our analysis. From group II, however, came three other burgomasters. Johan Grove, alderman of the Travelers to Bergen, disposed of a more modest fortune, totaling five houses and about 400 marks in capital, in his estate. Hermen Poling, a goldsmith, maker of the monstrance used in the parish church which adjoined the Lubeck town hall, owned only two houses; he was one of the few who rejected the settlement of 1416 and was exiled for leading a protest against it. He spent the remainder of his life under the protection of the Margrave of Brandenburg. We have already noted the extensive holdings of an armorer, ranging from a mansion to a warehouse; his name was Eler Stange, and he too served as burgomaster, in fact a remarkably outspoken one. Stange had married the niece of a councillor. While there is no definite evidence that any non-commercial artisans were burgomasters—records of such service are fragmentary for the new council—certainly persons in group III also were among the leaders of the new regime and held positions of major responsibility. For example, the pursemaker Gerhard van Mars was a town assessor, and represented Lubeck in the Hanseatic Diets of 1411–1412 which were considering its expulsion;

[80] The examples here are the very wealthy Eler Stange, who clearly moved in elite circles, compared to the butcher Johan van Lense. The holding of mansions by artisans was rare, but some unquestionably had sufficient wealth for it (see notes 71 and 72 above). In the totals given here, at least one of the four mansions, that of the tanner Hinrik Bekeman, had been purchased after 1411 from confiscated exile property. Stange's mansion came to him, along with his grain warehouse, through the dowry of his wife, a maternal niece of the councillor Arnd Sparenberch. The others belonged to Hinrik Landman, apparently a very successful butcher and alderman of the guild, and to Ludeke Vlensborch, whose profession could not be established (and was in fact probably not an artisan; he was unavoidably placed in group III for a lack of sufficient information).

[81] The examples here are, respectively, Otto Lenzeke contrasted with Bertolt van Northem; Johan Perzeval (son of the Johan who was burgomaster from 1363 to 1396) contrasted with Johan Kogelndal (born a serf of the count of Limburg, see LUB 7: no. 833).

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the hatter and pawnbroker Hinrik Melborch served as a judge, and was an ambassador to Denmark at the time of Eric's intervention.

The socioeconomic forces which established the new council of 1408 cannot be described by a single word or phrase, and that diversity must be emphasized. Clearly this was no artisan movement, as merchants and other men of some wealth outnumbered artisans by roughly two to one. On the other hand, calling it a merchants' movement would also not fit the evidence, as there was substantial artisan participation extending to leadership levels. Even describing it as a "citizens' movement" would not be wholly accurate, since we find here not a cross-section of the citizen population but, overwhelmingly, persons from roughly the top quarter of the citizenry. Perhaps the best short description, considering the context of the uprising, is that this was a taxpayers' revolt. The higher a man's taxes, it would seem, the more likely he was to join it.

In any case, analysis of the proponents of the uprising is sufficient to establish that this party did not form along any discernible economic, social or class lines. It follows, then, that "class hatred" of artisans for patricians was not a primary cause of the uprising.

4. FACTIONS IN THE ELITE

In the search for a new interpretation of the events in Lubeck in 1408, the extensive participation of members of the elite in the uprising demonstrated above naturally attracts our attention. Studies in the social history of other towns have suggested that some uprisings may have reflected social tensions within the elite. If the existing government was dominated by only a segment of the elite—whether that segment is labeled a "patriciate" or not—then other men of similar wealth might have resented this domination. For example, in any commercial town we would expect to find men with great wealth but without the proper connections, either self-made men or men of good birth in another town who had migrated in the expectation of at least keeping, if not raising, their status. These "new men," if they did not receive the political power or social reception they considered commensurate with their worth, could have joined with each other to force their way into a higher position.[82]

[82] See the review in Rotz, 1976. A noteworthy study of the problem of "new men" in Florence is Marvin Becker's "The *Novi Cives* in Florentine Politics" (1962).

In investigating this possibility in Lubeck, we are handicapped by the lack of a consensus on the definition of a patrician in a seaport town, or even, as noted, whether a true patriciate existed in Lubeck. Nevertheless, this debate on the patriciate suggests a possible socioeconomic division in the Lubeck elite which might have helped to precipitate an uprising. Lubeck historians have generally assumed that only a segment of the elite dominated town politics. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was a commonplace in Lubeck historiography that the membership of the Circle Society had constituted the Lubeck patriciate, even though the council was at no point composed entirely of Circle members. Then Fritz Rörig, enlarging upon a suggestion by Carl Wehrmann, developed a socioeconomic approach to explain and define this distinction. He decided, in line with his opinions described above (section 1), that the foundation of the Circle in 1379 was only a symbol and symptom of the larger transition in which, gradually over the second half of the fourteenth century, the children and grandchildren of the great merchants shifted their principal investments from commercial activity to landed estates, annuities, and urban property. According to Rörig, this change created a class of *rentiers* which nevertheless retained, with the help of associations like the Circle, control of the government of this commercial metropolis, shifting its policies from free trade to protectionism. This approach fits with work on other towns that has noted a tendency of the patriciate to "close up" in the same time period, making mobility into the elite and the government more difficult; a patrician society or corporation was one way to accomplish this. Karl Czok, among others, has seen that Rörig's suggestion has a possible application to uprisings. A vigorous and wealthy merchant might have had both personal and professional reasons for opposing a closed, *rentier* patriciate: a desire not only for recognition of his own upward mobility but to force changes in policy, making government more favorable to commerce. Ahasver von Brandt, however, disagrees wth these arguments. He finds no significant tendency of the Lubeck council to "close," i.e., to limit its choice of councillors to men from a smaller circle of families, nor for *rentiers* to appear on the council in any larger proportion or to affect policy to any greater degree than in previous generations. Von Brandt concludes that neither the term "patrician" nor the concept of a merchant versus *rentier* strug-

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gle are very useful in explaining Lubeck's development.[83]

The existence of such a debate requires that the term "patrician" be used in Lubeck only with caution, if at all; nevertheless it also suggests issues which can be used to analyze the uprising. The evidence—divisions in the old council, men of high status and wealth in the new—obviously indicates that a split in the elite accompanied the uprising. Was the movement of 1408 directed against a particular segment of the elite which controlled government on the basis of particular social and/or economic ties? More specifically, was the split in the elite a division between those inside the Circle Society and those outside it? Between "old families" and "new men"? Between men living as *rentiers* and men who were still active merchants? Answers to questions such as these, although they will not solve the problem of the Lubeck "patriciate," will at least help us understand the nature of the uprising.

It is possible to approach such questions because the course of events in 1408 to a considerable extent allowed the factions in the elite to define themselves in documents. We can reasonably assume that the body of exiles consisted primarily of those persons who considered themselves threatened and/or dislodged by the uprising. In other words, we should be able to determine the class or level, if any, against which the uprising was directed by examining who was in exile and who was not. Documents provide us with the names of thirty-seven exiles, including the fifteen departed councillors of 1408, four who would join the council after 1416, and thirty-six members of the Circle Society. Twenty-six of them were related in the male line to previous councillors, of Lubeck or other towns.[84] Their holdings within the walls totaled nine and one-half commercial properties (warehouses, bakeries, breweries, etc.), fourteen mansions and forty-one apartments, 121 houses, seventeen market stalls, and five gardens. Twenty of them had also invested outside the walls, in eighteen and one-half villages, sixty-three and one-half manors, four and one-half hides, a mill, a lake, a meadow, and two salt pans. There is evidence that seven of these rural investors, plus eleven others in the group, engaged in merchant activity.

Clearly these were wealthy men of good lineage and high status, but the exiles were by any measure only a portion of Lubeck's most prestigious citizens. We have, for example, already identified and described forty-one men in group I of the proponents of the uprising, men in or near the elite. In addition, there were others of very high status who apparently did not wish to support the uprising actively, but who also felt no need to leave Lubeck, for example the eight councillors who remained in 1408.[85] One cannot assume, of course, that such persons formed a political "party"; a variety of reasons might contribute to a decision to remain, for example ill health or a need for proximity to business enterprises. However, since all Lubeck citizens had freedom of movement during the uprising years unless they were outspoken in their criticism of the regime, the decision to remain in a town with a new constitution, under an imperial ban, was for most persons something of a political act, and was recog-

[83] Wehrmann's "Das lübeckische Patriziat" of 1872 is apparently the first work to suggest that the Circle marked the definition of the patriciate both as a class and as a group of *rentiers;* the ideas of Rörig appear in their most fully developed form in pp. 216–246 and 658–680 of his collected works (1971). Von Brandt outlines the extent of his disagreement, 1959: pp. 137–147, and 1966: pp. 231–235. See also Wehrmann, 1888; Fink, 1938; Wegemann, 1941. On the problem of patrician "closing," corporations, property, and their possible connections in other towns see especially Czok, 1963: pp. 101–103; Dollinger, 1950 and 1953; Irsigler, 1974.

[84] Use of only the male line to reckon descent here and elsewhere in this study is not to imply that descent in the female line was insignificant. However, the survival of evidence for the latter is much more erratic, and since these data are used primarily for comparative purposes it seemed wiser to employ the more reliable male descent as an index. In addition, of course, marriage to a daughter of an old line was a classic means of upward mobility for a "new man" whose son might not have been fully accepted into the elite.

[85] The split in the council is in fact rather more complicated than this. One of the "remained" councillors, Cort Brekewolt, apparently served briefly on the new council in 1410 (Nsb, p. 423) and hence in this study has been placed not among them but in group I of the proponents. On the other hand there is the vacillating conduct of Hermen Westval, the effective founder of the Westval "dynasty" which produced three councillors and two bishops of Lubeck in the fifteenth century. Westval not only initially remained in Lubeck but actively participated in the transfer of power to the new council in May, 1408 (which, for example, both Bernd Pleskow and Arnold Sparenberch refrained from doing). He then seems to have turned about and joined the exiles in late 1408 or 1409. However, he returned to Lubeck well before the settlement, probably by 1414 (his brother Conrad, who had joined him in exile, had definitely returned by 1413). Nevertheless he was recorded as one of the exiled councillors in documents of the settlement of 1416. In this study he has been reckoned for analysis in both the exiles and the remained councillors.

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nized as such in, for example, the documents of the settlement, where councillors who had remained were listed separately.[86] More importantly, to evaluate the split in the elite properly, it is also important to look at those persons in it who were apparently not threatened by the uprising.

By the standards of all Lubeck historians, whether they use the term "patrician" or not, councillors (before 1408 or after 1416) and Circle Society members were men of high status; from these rolls a sample of members of the elite not in exile can be drawn. As nearly as can be determined, at least forty-five such men—men who either were or became councillors and/or members of the Circle—were living and of age during the uprising years, and are found neither in exile nor actively supporting the new regime.[87] Among them are seven past and fourteen future councillors, thirty-eight Circle Society members, and twenty-one men related to councillors in the male line. In town they held ten and one-half commercial properties, fifteen mansions and thirty-two apartments, 194 houses, seven market stalls, and six gardens; on the land, sixteen of them held eleven villages and twenty-six and one-half manors, plus a mill, a wood, and a meadow. Thirty are documented merchants, and one was a banker.

Obviously the exiles comprised only a segment of Lubeck's elite; the question is to what extent that segment can be defined by social and/or economic factors. A comparison of these three groups —exiles, apparent "neutrals" of the elite, and group I of the proponents—should provide the answer. Since the three groups are not precisely the same size, an accurate comparison requires the use of percentages and averages, and these may be found in table 2.

First let us consider the traditional definition of a Lubeck "patrician," membership in the Circle Society. While all but one of the exiles were Circle members (97 per cent), the reverse is not true: the entire Circle Society was not in exile.

TABLE 2

SOCIOECONOMIC COMPARISONS OF POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE ELITE

	Proponents Group I	Other Council and Circle	Exiles
% Circle	34	84	97
% with male-line councillor relative	10	47	70
% merchant	90	67	49
Urban			
Average commercial properties	0.29	0.23	0.26
Average mansions	0.21	0.33	0.37
Average houses	3.78	4.31	3.27
Rural			
% with land	22	36	54
Average villages	0.12	0.24	0.50
Average manors	0.33	0.59	1.72

The sample of apparent "neutrals" in the elite is 84 per cent composed of Circle members; even 34 per cent of group I belonged to the Circle. Thus, while there is a small degree of correlation between society membership and political position, it is impossible to say that the movement of 1408 was directed against the Circle Society or its members as a group. The correlation between family ties and political behavior is considerably sharper: only 10 per cent of group I were male-line relatives of councillors, against 47 per cent of the "neutrals" and 70 per cent of the exiles. Among the elite, the movement of 1408 drew its strongest support from "new men." This is further illustrated in table 1, where it is noted that only five men in group I were established as second-generation elite or more (subgroup I*a*). The bulk of this group, twenty-three men, were those whose ties to the elite came only in their generation (I*b*), while eight more (I*c*) were placed in group I primarily on the achievements of their descendants. This, however, is not the same as saying that the movement was directed against those with family connections. There were, indeed, twenty-six such men in exile, but also twenty-one among the "neutrals." In fact, if we combine those known to have supported the uprising and those who chose to remain in the city during it, then there were as many or more male-line relatives of councillors (and substantially more Circle Society members) inside Lubeck between 1408 and 1416 than there were

[86] C **26**: p. 423.

[87] The list was confined to those who either joined the Circle or the council before 1429; that is the date when the Circle membership roll was prepared, and was used for the council also in order to have a consistent base for both. Close relatives of known exiles were not included unless there was definite proof that they remained, in spite of the fact that between letters, confiscations, and settlements the identity of the exiles is as well established as anything about this uprising. In the event, one can find documentation to fix 29 of these men inside the walls and another four were brothers of such documented cases.

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among the exiles.[88] Neither Circle membership nor descent from previous council families fully explains the political divisions within the elite.

The economic evidence is more difficult to interpret. Such material must in any case be used cautiously. One can establish from documents that an individual engaged in merchant activity; one cannot presume the opposite, that silence in these documents necessarily means a man was not a merchant. Neither can one definitively establish the existence of a *rentier* but rather only estimate, from size of property holdings, how likely it was that such items provided a man with the bulk of his income. Nevertheless, if there is uncertainty with individuals, the comparison of what can be found for various groups in a defined documentary base can be at least be useful.

That comparison (table 2) indicates that it was likely that there were more active merchants among supporters of the uprising and more *rentiers* among the exiles; yet the lines are not sharply drawn, and the data for the "neutrals" make it even more difficult to establish a "merchant vs. *rentier*" conflict. Evidence of merchant activity was found for 90 per cent of the men in group I and for two-thirds of the neutrals, but for only 49 per cent of the exiles. One can conclude from this that the uprising drew its strongest support from commercially active men, but on the other hand certainly the exiles cannot be described as a group that had abandoned commerce. Nearly half of the exiles were merchants, and some were outstanding ones, for example two drapers, a Traveler to Bergen, and an alderman of the Travelers to Scania.[89] Analysis of property holdings makes the distinctions even less clear. One cannot even say with confidence that the exiles had more income from property than the men of the other groups. A man of group I had, on the average, about as much property inside Lubeck as did an exile, in fact rather more if one discounts mansions. The "neutral" segment had even more extensive urban holdings, averaging more than one house per man larger than those of the exiles. Thus, just as there were a substantial number of active merchants among the exiles, it seems likely that there were many *rentiers* at least in the "neutrals" if not also in group I.

If there was a significant difference in possession of property between the groups, then table 2 indicates that it was not so much the total amount of property as the location of it—specifically, whether it was urban or rural property. A far greater proportion of the exiles had invested outside town walls, and in far more massive quantities. The exiles' landed estates average about five times those of group I, and from two to nearly three times those of the "neutrals." This factor correlates far better with the groups than a "merchant vs. *rentier*" division. Yet even this sharp distinction does not fully explain the division in the elite. Nearly half the exiles (46 per cent) apparently held no manors or villages; neither can one say that the uprising was directed against all rural landowners, since some twenty-five of them (sixteen "neutrals" and nine in group I) remained.

Such results are perhaps most useful in describing what the uprising was not. Just as the proponents of it did not stem from a single class or economic group, so the uprising was not directed against all or even most members of a single social or economic category: not the "squires" in the Circle, not the old families, not the *rentiers*—and thus not the "patriciate" by any of the standards used by historians who speak of a Lubeck patriciate. This evidence confirms that the traditional interpretation of this uprising as a social movement of an artisan class against a patrician class must be abandoned.

Nevertheless it does seem likely that to some extent the alignment of forces did reflect some socioeconomic tensions, at least within the elite.

[88] By my count there were at least twenty-seven direct male-line relatives of councillors who remained: four proponents, twenty-one in the Circle-councillor sample, and a few sons of councillors not in the Circle, e.g., Johan Schepenstede, Emil Luchow. At least fifty men (including twelve proponents) who remained were or became Circle members. Two examples of families always considered "patrician" by those who use the term may help to illustrate the point. The principal leader of the exiles, descended from a long line of councillors and burgomasters, was Jordan Pleskow; however, his first cousin Bernd Pleskow, with an equally illustrious lineage, was one of the councillors who remained, as did their distant cousin and future councillor Godeke Pleskow. Gerhard and Hermen Darsow had been not only outstanding councillors but founders of the Circle Society; they were deceased by 1408, but their younger brother Johan, later to become a councillor (1416–1434), never left Lubeck, nor, apparently, did any other Darsow. Those familiar with Lubeck family history may wish to also note that neither the Kerkrings of the time nor the last Mornewech went into exile.

[89] In addition to upme Orde and Vockinghusen (notes 74 and 76 above), Tideman Brekelveld, Ludeke Osenbrugghe, Hinrik Rapesulver, and Hinrik Westhof are examples.

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Table 2 shows an interesting degree of correlation between socioeconomic factors and position on Lubeck's "political spectrum" in 1408. It seems likely that there were in fact men from old families who were reducing their merchant activity and investing in property—especially in landed estates (or of course, who had inherited such property). To a considerable extent such men tended to respond to the uprising by going into exile, or (to a lesser extent) by remaining "neutral"; few supported it. Apparently there also existed a good many "new" men in the elite who were very active commercially and had less of their capital in property; what property they had was almost completely urban. These men tended to support the uprising or to take a neutral stance; only a few were in exile.

But one should be cautious about assuming that these socioeconomic differences explain the split within the elite, let alone that these possible tensions caused the uprising. In the first place there are a disquieting number of exceptions: men of old lines who were still commercial and urban, "new" men with estates, in fact men of all conceivable types, and showing up at virtually all conceivable points on the "spectrum." There are also other factors, neither social nor economic, which seem to have played an equal or larger role in the formation of parties within the elite. For example, if one considers only the councillors of 1408, then the division among them, perplexingly, correlates better with length of council service than with any socioeconomic factor. To illustrate: there were fifteen exiled councillors. Nine of them (60 per cent) held rural land, but at least four of these, plus four others, were demonstrably active merchants (53.3 per cent). Eight of them were descended in the male line from councillors (53.3 per cent), but this also means that seven apparently were not. If one compares results using these factors with those for the eight councillors who remained, there is indeed a contrast: of the latter, five were active merchants (62.5 per cent), and only one (12.5 per cent) had rural land, the same one who had a councillor ancestor. However, the contrast using years on the council is much more striking, correlating with 80 per cent or more of the decisions on both sides. The ten "eldest" councillors—men who had been on the council the longest—all went into exile, and twelve of the fifteen exiles (80 per cent) had joined the council before 1400. Conversely, of the eight who remained, none had taken his seat before 1393 and six had been councillors for only six years or less. Unfortunately it is not possible to determine the actual age of these councillors with any assurance of accuracy, but the evidence definitely implies at least a political, if not also a chronological, "generation gap" on the council. Turning to the entire body of exiles, it appears that with a few exceptions, the decision to leave Lubeck depended to a great extent on a man's blood or marriage ties to the exiled segment of the council. One exile was originally from a council family of another Hanseatic town, and returned to it; his motive was probably just a desire to avoid the disturbances. Three more were partners in a major commercial corporation who left only after the imperial ban was declared, undoubtedly because they needed to evade it to continue their Rhenish and Venetian trade. If we discount these, then the fifteen specific councillors plus their close relatives account for 94 per cent of the remaining exiles (thirty-one of thirty-three).[90]

The soundest conclusion, considering all the evidence, is probably that the uprising was directed not so much against a socioeconomic group within the elite as against a particular faction of the Lubeck council. Members of that faction indeed tended to have particular social and economic characteristics, while their opponents tended to have different social and economic characteristics. Nevertheless the correlations are not strong enough to indicate that the elite divided primarily along socioeconomic lines. Conversely, clearly something else is at work: for the most part, just the "eldest" councillors and their relatives left Lubeck because of the uprising. Such an alignment arouses a suspicion that politics was more important than economics in determining the alignment of forces. This is not to say that the social and economic factors within the elite were insignificant and should be disregarded, but only that

[90] Nicolaus Brömse returned to Luneburg; Tideman Brekelveld and Hinrik upme Orde were partners with Siverd Vockinghusen (see notes 74 and 76 above). Otherwise the exiles include three brothers and a half-brother, seven sons, two sons-in-law, a brother-in-law and his son, and a wife's nephew (closely tied economically) of the fifteen councillors. Intermarriage among council families was of course frequent, and thus a degree of kinship would be expected in such a group; not, however, in excess of 90 per cent. For example, a similar search among the sample of councillors and Circle members not in exile yielded only thirty of the forty-five, or 67 percent, of persons traceably related to anyone else in this much larger sample, and that figure includes far more distant relations, e.g., two distant cousins and two men who had married distant cousins of others in the sample.

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the traditional interpretation may have placed the cart before the horse. In the latter, such things as town politics and town finance served only as "excuses" for an uprising which was really caused by social and economic problems. What seems just as likely, on the above evidence, is that in fact the political quarrels were the primary cause, that while social and economic tensions may have been an important undercurrent it was principally a man's attitudes toward specific persons and specific policies which put him on one side or the other. No doubt some of the "new men" supported the uprising in part because they resented the dominance of men from "old families" in government, and/or resented their own exclusion from the topmost levels of power and prestige. No doubt some active merchants supported the uprising because of the economic distance between themselves and certain less mercantile councillors who lived from property and annuity income. But another possibility is worth consideration: that the elite was divided primarily by an issue or set of issues for which simple economic self-interest would tend to place men with more commercial and more urban investments on one side, men with less commercial, more rural investments on the other.

The citizens' complaints in and after 1405 focus around just such a set of issues. The Committee of Sixty had of course cited specific problems, not general policies, in their protests, but in effect their message was that the council had given too little attention to government inside town walls: to finance, administration of muncipal properties and agencies, and so forth. It would also seem that in their opinion the council's activities outside the walls had been misdirected: the citizens found too much time and money spent on territorial acquisition, not enough on the protection of commerce. In brief, the Sixty had protested against the policies of the past—the policies, presumably, of the "eldest" councillors—and had asked government instead to be more commercial and more urban. The foregoing analysis indicates that "younger" councillors and those members of the elite whose investments were commercial and urban tended toward some sympathy for the uprising, while "elder" councillors and men of the elite with less merchant activity and more land outside the walls tended to oppose it. It seems entirely plausible, then, to suggest that in 1408 the elite was indeed split by primarily political issues, and further, that these were the same issues which had aroused the rest of the citizenry.

5. EFFECT AND CAUSE IN THE LUBECK UPRISING

Some uprisings of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, although they occurred in an environment of "crisis," stemmed basically not from economic distress or social tension but from struggles over personalities and policies in government. The personalities were members of the elite, quarreling over which faction would dominate the town; the policies were, in most cases, those which had cost money, most frequently decisions for war or which had led to war. When the ruling faction found it necessary to ask for higher taxes, then they gave their opposition an issue on which an alliance of men from many social and economic levels could be based, for obviously all citizens were concerned with taxes. If the attempt to make changes within the existing government failed, revolt could follow, at times going well beyond the bounds which the dissatisfied members of the elite would have set for it. Even in extreme cases, in which the eventual alignment of forces seems to reflect socioeconomic differences to a considerable extent, uprisings sparked by a split in the elite remain primarily political in cause and character. They were not social movements which expressed themselves politically, but rather political movements with certain social implications. The difference is more than a mere rearrangement of words; at stake is the principal motive for an uprising, and thus its true place in the broader context of urban and social history.[91]

The foregoing evidence has eliminated other interpretive approaches. Obviously there was in Lubeck in 1408 no movement of the poor, since all the known supporters of it were, as nearly as can be determined, citizens, and over 90 per cent of them can be documented as holders of investment property. Nor was it artisan desires for "democracy" or artisan economic discontent which caused the uprising: the proponents of it were not predominantly artisan, and of the artisan minority most were from economically stable trades and prosperous enough. "Class hatred" will not explain the evidence, since the new regime was supported by men from many social and economic levels, and the uprising was not directed against a class or a particular social group. Rather, the data indicate a movement of substantial taxpayers,

[91] Rotz, 1976. On the extent to which even an apparently lower-class rising can result from simple policy issues and splits in the elite, see especially the works of Gene A. Brucker on Florence (1962 and 1968).

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TABLE 3

COUNCILS AND INDEXES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 1360–1450

	% Circle	% Ancestry	% Rural	Villages	Manors	% Merchant	Commercial Properties	Houses
1360	0	32/36*	39	10	21½	50	6	138
1363	0	37/41*	44	14	26	63	9	141
1365	4	35/39*	50	20	27	69	11	145
1367	17	42	50	25	57	75	10½	143
1370	19	33	44	21	34	81	10	136
1375	23	27	50	22	40	84	10	137
1382	41	41	52	21	39½	85	9	131
1385	48	44	52	22	44	85	7½	123
1389	65	48	57	23	43	78	6½	125
1393	73	46	54	23	41½	73	9	125
1397	70	41	48	20	35	70	6	128
1406	77	38	42	13½	31½	65	6	138½
1416	70	26	33	10½	15	78	8½	154
1426	79	21	25	7	13	92	6½	157
1428	76	28	28	7½	33½	93	13	152
1433	78	37	33	8	39½	85	13½	157½
1438	82	36	32	6	23	86	14	165
1447	86	38/43*	29	2½	20½	86	15	171

* One councillor uncertain.

largely those with commercial interests, against not the entire council but only a portion of it. There was a split on the council and in the elite as a whole. To what extent can the Lubeck uprising be judged a basically political struggle growing out of factions in the elite?

To explore that possibility, we can look at the composition of the Lubeck council over time. The settlement of the uprising was a compromise, and it had an impact on the membership of the council. Thus councils after 1416, compared to the traditions of council composition before the uprising, should reflect some of the changes which supporters of the uprising wished to make. In order to judge this, evidence was gathered for all men known to have served on the Lubeck council from 1360 to 1408 and from 1416 to 1450. Table 3 displays a summary of that evidence. Here twelve councils from the pre-uprising period and six from after the uprising have been compared in terms of percentages of Circle Society members and of men with a male-line relative on a previous council, percentage of rural landlords and degree of rural property investment, and percentage of documented merchants and degree of urban property investment. The years are those in which significant changes in membership occurred, and are chosen so that every known councillor appears at least once in the calculations. Since the number of councillors varied, to compare degree of property investment, the total holdings of all councillors were added and then, if necessary, adjusted mathematically to the level of a council of twenty-seven.[92]

The most obvious conclusion which can be drawn from table 3 is that even before 1408 the composition of the Lubeck council in terms of these factors fluctuated considerably over time. For example, the council between 1360 and 1408 varied from a low of 27 per cent to a high of 48 per cent of its membership being those with male-line councillor relatives; 39 to 57 per cent composed of those with rural investments; 50 to 85 per cent documented merchant. The adjusted property holdings of an entire council range from ten villages and twenty-one and one-half manors to twenty-five villages and fifty-seven manors; from 123 houses to 145. Thus there were, apparently, changes in the type of person who served as councillor and changes in the principal directions in which councillors used their capital.

More difficult is finding patterns in those changes. For example, if these indexes are valid, they call into further question the particulars of the *"rentier* thesis." In this approach, old fami-

[92] The figures should, of course, be taken as only approximate indexes. For purposes of simplifying them, all "mansions" (see note 78 above) were reckoned into the figures for houses, as two houses. All computations have been rounded off to the nearest half-unit.

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lies were believed to have moved their capital from commerce to property while keeping control of the council. One would therefore expect councils high in members from "old families" to also be high in property and low in merchant activity, but this is not the case. In the 1360's both the percentage from "old families" and the property holdings of the council increased, but so did the percentage of merchants. The council of 1375, with one of the lowest percentages of men from "old families," indeed was 84 per cent merchant but also had, comparatively speaking, very high property levels, equal or superior to those of the 1389 council (which was 48 per cent from "old families"). In general, there is no consistent correlation between a high percentage of merchants and a high degree of "new men" on the council, nor between a low percentage of merchants and a high degree of property investment.

It is nevertheless possible on this evidence to speculate to some extent as to what may describe the changes in the council over time. In terms of "old" versus "new" families, the council had a tendency to "close up" for a time and then "open" for a time, following which the process was repeated. From 1360 to 1367 the council tended to close, to a peak of 42 per cent from "old families"; then it "opened up" for eight years. Interestingly, 1367 was a plague year. From 1382 to 1389 it again tended to close, reaching a peak of 48 per cent in 1389—which, together with 1388, was also a plague year. This time, the "opening" process was more gradual, and was apparently still going on at the time of the next plague outbreak in 1405. It is at least plausible to suggest that the Lubeck council tended to close until a plague diminished the supply of men from old families, forcing it to turn to those without ancestral connections. In any case, it was fluctuation which was traditional.

The uprising, it seems, had only a limited impact on the council in some areas. For example, there was little change in the relationship between the council and the Circle Society. The low percentages of Circle members on the council before about 1390, of course, reflect that the society was founded only in 1379; only a small percentage of the early councillors lived long enough to have a chance at membership. In 1393 and after, with the society well established, the figures level off at 70 to 77 per cent Circle members. The Circle was just as strong as this, if not stronger, on the post-1416 councils, with the figure never falling below 70 per cent and reaching an all-time peak of 86 per cent by 1447. This tends to confirm the earlier evidence that the 1408 struggle was not members versus non-members of the Circle. Opinion on the role of the Circle Society in Lubeck's social and political history may need to be revised, but whatever the case, the evidence provides little grounds for making the society a factor in the uprising.

Table 3 also confirms the earlier impression that, while there may have been some reflection of tension between "old" and "new" families in the uprising, this was probably not a major factor. For example, the immediate pre-uprising council had probably a smaller percentage of men from "old families" than any of the previous thirty years. It is true that the councils of the immediate post-uprising period, 1416–1428, were, on the whole, composed of more "new men" than most; even these, however, were not totally out of line with Lubeck tradition, since they varied from 21 to 28 per cent men with male-line councillor relatives, figures comparable with the 27 per cent of 1375. After about 1430 councils returned to the levels of 30 to 40 per cent which were also typical of most of the pre-uprising period. We know that some supporters of the uprising were admitted to power, and this shows up in the figures, but apparently the settlement did not include a general principle that councils would be permanently more "open" than before.

Some changes are both more striking and more permanent. Obviously, as the former exile councillors died, they were replaced by active merchants. Every council from 1426 to 1450 was 85 per cent merchant or more, thus equalling or surpassing the highest figure for any pre-uprising council.[93] Another change in pattern is equally

[93] One must always consider the possibility that fluctuations in figures such as these stem from a sudden improvement in surviving documentation, but that is not the case here. For merchant activity the level of documentation is in fact far better for the pre-uprising period, especially for the late 1360's and the 1370's, from which poundage books of Lubeck, Hamburg, and Reval all survive. Another set of Hamburg poundage books, from 1399 to 1400, also exists. For merchant activity after 1400, however, we have only the far slimmer Hamburg poundage book of 1418; beyond that, only the chance survivals of claims for robbery or other loss, etc. common to any period. Thus the extraordinarily high percentages of documented merchants on the post-uprising councils are quite remarkable. Neither is the low level of rural investment of councillors after 1416 likely to stem from lack of documentation. Surviving records for urban properties, and for noble holdings, in the same period are substantial. Düker, 1932, and Schulze, 1957, confirm the general re-

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interesting. Up to the 1370's, both types of property investment—urban and rural—had tended to rise or fall together. But beginning in the late 1370's or early 1380's something of a reverse correlation between rural and urban property levels appears which lasts for the next generation: roughly, as landed possessions increased, houses and warehouses decreased. The councils of *ca.* 1385–1393, with over half of their members holding landed estates, and in relatively high quantities, also show the lowest level of urban property of any in the ninety-year period. Then, by the later 1390's, the data indicate the beginning of a gradual shift back from rural to urban investment. In the years immediately following the uprising this trend suddenly and massively accelerated. After 1416 the level of rural investment shrank, while urban holdings increased dramatically. The highest percentage of men with landed estates on any post-uprising council was about one-third, which is lower than the lowest pre-uprising figure. On the whole the rural holdings are also lower than anything before the uprising, with the brief exception of the 1428–1433 period.[94] Conversely, the level of urban investment of councillors from 1416 on is higher than anything in pre-uprising years. The change is clear and sharp, and it is hard to doubt that it was related to the uprising.

To summarize: the principal long-term effect of the uprising of 1408 was that it made Lubeck's government more commercially oriented and more town-oriented. Thus the evidence of table 3 tends to confirm the suggestion that the uprising is best explained as a conflict over town policies, specifically the policies criticized in the citizen complaints of 1405–1408. The Sixty and their supporters expressed concern about high taxes and how those taxes were spent; citizens wanted town government to adjust its priorities, to pay more attention to internal affairs and the needs of commerce. Table 3 indicates that eventually they probably got at least part of their wish. The councils after 1416, and especially after 1426, were composed largely of men whose principal investments were urban and mercantile. Such men were no doubt economically and politically inclined to adjust governmental priorities along the lines demanded by the citizens.

As nearly as can be determined, the council's policies after 1416 show that priorities were adjusted to some extent. We do not know whether consultation with citizens became a regular part of the governmental process, but both foreign policy and finance show the impact of the uprising. Lubeck's posture toward her neighbors after 1416 was anything but aggressive. The council successfully regained the lands and rights in Lauenburg which had been lost since 1401, but, as noted above, only by making a joint effort with Hamburg. Otherwise there was no attempt to expand Lubeck's territorial holdings. Outside of this campaign, Lubeck's only significant military activity for a decade after the uprising was an expedition against a nest of Frisian pirates. The decision to go to war with Denmark came only in 1426: only after Eric had proclaimed the Sound tolls, increased the Scania tolls, and taken merchants prisoner at Scania; only after Count Henry of Holstein had gone to Lubeck and made a personal appeal for aid against Eric. At that, Lubeck's first response in 1426 was to arrange a peace conference, and only after its failure did the town turn to war.[95] Even more impressively, the council managed the conflict with Denmark without increasing the basic tax and while keeping a balanced budget—in fact, for six of the first seven years of war the treasury showed a surplus. Half the cost of the war was supported with short-term loans, largely from councillors and other wealthy citizens. The council sold no perpetual annuities and only a few life annuities during these years, and even stopped selling the latter after 1436. In this way it avoided the long-term obligations which had plagued town finance before the uprising.[96] The overall picture is one of a council

treat of Lubeck citizens from landed investments at this time.

[94] The 1428–1433 period corresponds almost exactly with the service of Bruno Warendorp, who became a councillor in 1428 and resigned in 1435. He held a village and eighteen manors, and thus is almost solely responsible for inflating the index in those years.

[95] C **28**: pp. 100–110, 170–172, 226–227, 238–244, 250–254, 367–368, 376–377, 382–383. Hoffman, 1889: pp. 159–164.

[96] Fritze, 1961*b*: pp. 84–89. From Fritze's Marxist point of view, the fact that the council chose to levy an excise tax rather than to increase the basic property tax (*Schoss*), and to take loans from the wealthy which would have to be repaid, presumably at interest, from funds raised by taxes, shows only how the council placed the real burden of financing the war on the back of the ordinary citizen. True enough, but what Fritze's evidence also shows, in the context of the uprising, is the spectacular contrast between the 1426–1433 council, which carried on an apparently unavoidable major war on land and sea with good fiscal management and with minimal long-term indebtedness, and the 1394–1405 council, which had incurred a long-term debt of over 70,000 marks with

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pursuing careful territorial and financial policies which, by the time decisions were made, probably had the support of at least the commercial segment of the citizenry. One may, of course, debate whether it was sincere concern for citizen wishes which motivated the council, or merely a desire to evade another uprising, but the contrast with the pre-1408 council is striking. In any case, although in and after 1427 Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, and Hamburg were shaken by internal disturbances, Lubeck was not.[97]

Approaching the uprising as a conflict over policies thus fits the evidence for both the composition of parties in the uprising and the effects of the uprising. This applies even to the elite. Table 2 indicated that men with less commercial activity and more landed estates tended to oppose the uprising, while men with more commercial activity and fewer estates tended to support it, although there were many exceptions. If the uprising was a "taxpayers' revolt," many citizens would have chosen sides primarily on the extent to which they felt their tax moneys were being spent in their interests. As noted above, the citizens were well aware that a major cause of Lubeck's high taxation was a foreign policy which led to wars for and in defense of territory. Citizens with landed estates in the area defended might have felt satisfied with such expenditures, while more commercially oriented members of the elite without rural land might have considered the funds better spent on harbors or expeditions against pirates—or not spent at all. The exceptions to this could simply have reflected honest differences of opinion: Lubeck's territorial holdings, after all, did work to protect some trade routes, notably the important "salt road" to Luneburg. One would also expect to find a few men whose opinions did not stem from economic interests: rural landlords who did not expect all the citizens to pay for the defense of their personal property, as well as landless merchants who were convinced that defense needs or the glory of the town justified the wars. In any case, even the split in the elite can be explained at least as well by attitudes to policies of the council as it can by socioeconomic tensions.

The high degree of participation by members of the elite in the uprising, then, may have stemmed simply from greater concern about the use of taxes by the men who paid the most taxes.[98] It is also definitely possible that the uprising began in the elite, even on the council, and was carried by members of the elite to others outside their level in an effort to find allies for their position. The evidence above shows that a faction had developed on the council which was less commercially active, had somewhat less urban investment, and was far more interested in landed estates than the elite as a whole. This faction apparently dominated the council and gave more attention to problems outside town walls, for example control of territory, than to internal problems or merchant needs. But merchants with primarily town properties also sat on the council, and might well have opposed such policies. These men, even though they formed a minority on the council, could have felt with considerable justification that they reflected the wishes of the majority of the town's leading citizens, or even the majority of all citizens. If they failed to persuade their colleagues to change direction, then it would not be surprising to find these councillors taking their case to a citizenry angered by high taxes. These taxpayers might have been prepared to take far stronger action against the dominant policy-makers than the councillors wished. In other words, a split in the elite over council policies can potentially explain the behavior of those outside the elite as well.

What evidence is there for such a split? First of all, table 3 indicates that the process of selec-

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its ambitious canal project and related struggles. Of course, the excise tax was probably not popular; it had been the proposal for such a tax in 1403 which had triggered the first citizen protests. Nevertheless the excise tax which accompanied the Danish wars was levied only in 1428, i.e., after the war had run for two years and after the major defeat in 1427 of the naval forces led by Tideman Steen. It is thus entirely possible that by that time citizens had become convinced that such a tax was necessary. In any case, even the evidence for the excise tax can be interpreted to show the council's concern for its citizens. We do not know the rate or precisely what items were taxed, but less than one-fourth of the total war costs were financed with it. Further, apparently it was greatly reduced in alternate years, since the income from it varied greatly: 200 marks in its first year, 2,702 in its second, 250 in its third, and so on. That councillors willingly accepted short-term notes rather than the more usual annuities is also noteworthy. Thus the overall impression, compared to previous practice, is of a council which was carefully considering the wishes of, and perhaps compromising with, its citizens. Fritze himself admits in a later work that the council's financial policy was "clever," 1967*a*: p. 230.

[97] C **28**: pp. 288–298, 389–390. Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 186–245. Hoffman, 1889: pp. 159–164.

[98] von Brandt, 1966: p. 226 shows that in Lubeck in 1460 the top 19 per cent of the taxable population provided 58 per cent of the funds raised by the basic tax (*Schoss*).

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tion of new councillors had created the potential for a division on the council. The movement of 1408 cannot be described as a revolt against a council that was more land-oriented than previous ones; since 1393 the council had gradually become less "landed" and more "urban" in all categories and if anything, the councillors of 1408 held less rural land than any council since the 1360's. The figures in table 3 imply, and data for individual councillors confirm, that for whatever reasons—perhaps the plague's toll in the old families—the Lubeck council had from the mid-1390's filled its vacancies with men more oriented to town than countryside.[99] Such a change in the composition of the council could have been precisely what was necessary for the revolt to occur, because this condition favored the development of factions on the council.[100]

This recalls the strong positive correlation which we found between length of council service and exile: the ten "eldest" councillors all went into exile, while none who remained had joined the council before 1393. Various factors relevant to length of council service might have helped shape a man's attitude. The longer a man had been a councillor, the more knowledge and experience he had gained in Hanseatic affairs, in diplomacy, in struggles with the nobility and so on; thus the more likely for him to take a point of view which looked beyond town walls politically as well as commercially, seeing territorial acquisition and wars on behalf of other Hanseatic towns as in the true interests of Lubeck. Of course, the longer a man had been a councillor, the more likely for him also to think of himself as governing not for, but rather above, the citizenry, and thus for him to fail to see a need for citizen participation in government.[101] The potential for a political "generation gap" on the Lubeck council of 1408, however, was even greater than this. The dominant faction of the council, the faction which became the exiles, consisted primarily of those "elder" councillors who in part were themselves estate-holders. In addition, they had served on the relatively "closed," heavily rural-oriented councils of the 1380's and 1390's; those councils were committed to policies of territorial expansion for Lubeck, and their surviving members would have had a strong tendency to continue to support these policies. By the same token, since these men had been councillors in the years when the Peace of Stralsund was still little challenged, they would have tended to support the Hanseatic alliance system vigorously, and through it international influence for their town. For all of these reasons, then, such councillors would have tended to stand for territorial expansion and against citizen consultation. The councillors who remained in Lubeck in 1408, on the other hand, came from among the newer and more "urban" members. Perhaps they were more sensitive to the needs of the ordinary citizen since they had recently been citizens themselves, but more importantly they were not committed to the expansionist policies of the past and had seen, before joining the council, the increasing citizen discontent at the cost of Lubeck's pursuit of power on land and sea. Thus they well could have come to believe that Lubeck should exercise

[99] For example, of the ten councillors taken in and after 1402, only one, Nicolaus van Stiten, held any rural property, and that was less than a manor. Note also that only one of these ten, Nicolaus van Orden (who died in 1407), was related in the male line to a previous councillor. He was the son of Conrad van Orden, councillor 1372–1382 (and stepson of his colleague on the council Tideman Junghe, 1391–1421).

[100] In many cases uprisings occurred during or shortly after plague epidemics; attempts to explain this relationship have rested on presumed economic, social, or even psychological effects of the Black Death and following outbreaks. See Renouard, 1950; Baehrel, 1952; Kelter, 1953; Langer, 1958 and 1964. The present investigation, however, implies that in Lubeck the plague's relationship to the uprising, if any, was that by causing the deaths of councillors in 1388–1389 and 1405–1406 it forced changes in the composition of the town council, and thus in the balance of power between factions in town politics. Note, however, the work of Peters, 1939, which after extensive analysis has determined that the first and most devastating plague outbreak (1350), at least, made no significant change in the economic or familial composition of the Lubeck council.

[101] In many towns, councillors were exempt from all but extraordinary taxation as a means of compensation for their otherwise unpaid services. Thus their attitudes on the need for taxes could easily differ substantially from those of even quite wealthy citizens. Unfortunately, since the Lubeck tax rolls are largely lost, and in any case would provide little help since about the wealthiest 20 per cent of the citizens paid their taxes secretly, we do not know whether this was the case in Lubeck: see von Brandt, 1966: p. 218; Reincke, 1951*b*: pp. 26–27; Hartwig, 1903: pp. 168–170, 182. In Rostock, one of the few towns under Lubeck law for which usable tax rolls survive, councillors probably were normally exempt from taxation: Fritze, 1967*a*: pp. 119–120. The last scholar to make a thorough study of Lubeck taxation before the rolls were lost, Julius Hartwig, believed that Lubeck councillors did tax themselves until the sixteenth century (1903: p. 58), but the document which he cites in support of this, LUB **6**: no. 783, apparently dates from shortly after the uprising and is phrased in a manner which could refer to an exceptional circumstance.

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only such power as its taxpayers could comfortably afford.

Finally, the narrative of events itself hints that there was a minority faction on the council which supported a different course from that of the majority. The principal demand of the citizens from 1405 was the need for greater citizen participation in government, which they hoped would serve to correct the offensive financial policies and persuade the council to alter its priorities. There is good reason to believe that there was support for this position on the council and within the elite even before other citizens coalesced around these issues. The council's territorial policy from about 1400, for example, was inconsistent and has the ring of compromise about it: accepting the loss of Bergedorf while keeping Mölln, consulting with citizens before embarking on the Wendish wars. Even more indicative of a split is the council's vacillation in its attitudes toward citizens, which led eventually to a complete turnabout in its position from 1406 to 1407. It is quite defensible to say that in the strictest sense it was the council which caused the Lubeck uprising, and not only because it had called for higher taxes. The Committee of Sixty had been formed in response to a suggestion of the council; it and the citizen administrative overseers had been accepted by the council. Revolt came only when the council reversed itself and tried to disband the citizen institutions which it had once approved. Such an abrupt change of heart implies a divided council, in which a less expansionist, more commercial, more "pro-citizen" faction somehow lost influence in or after 1406.[102]

Furthermore, this factionalization was probably a necessary precondition for the uprising. The movement of 1408 arose not against the most "closed" council or the most landed council; what seems likely, then, is that it arose against the most divided council. The uprising, when it came, was directed against only the council's dominant faction—presumably the principal defenders of the territorial policy and the major opponents of government with citizen participation. All this strongly suggests that the minority segment of the council, presumably more moderate on these issues, wittingly or unwittingly had encouraged others outside the council to organize and protest. By 1408 some of these angry citizens had apparently decided that, if persuasion could not change the policies, replacement of councillors could. This, it would seem, was farther than the minority councillors and many of their supporters in the elite wished to go, and they withdrew from active politics. Still, such a faction must have remained somewhat sympathetic to the new government, and in any case had no need to go into exile under a regime which was to some extent merely putting its own policies into practice.

Considering the uprising as essentially a policy split which began in the elite thus accounts for all the evidence which we have better than any other interpretation. Socioeconomic data will not fully explain the composition of the parties, while the course of events implies the existence of a faction on the council and in the elite which wanted to change council policies but drew back from an uprising as the means for that change. It also seems likely that as a result of the uprising this minority faction of the 1408 council became the dominant force in Lubeck politics after 1416. The settlement of 1416 was a compromise, and such a faction could have provided the "middle ground" on which a compromise could have been based. The fate of the former exiles implies that this was in fact what happened. As we have seen, after 1416 there were major changes in the composition of the council. The power of the exiles and their descendants, once the dominant faction, was severely limited, and Lubeck government was instead placed in the hands of men who were not only more commercially active, but whose nonmerchant capital was invested primarily within town walls. To this political insult was added financial injury: in 1427 the former exiles were forced to settle for only two-thirds of the sum which had originally been awarded to them in

[102] One might speculate that the death of the young burgomaster Henning van Rentelen in Paris in 1406 reduced the influence of the "moderate" faction. This certainly was the kind of event that was likely to lead to a shift in power relationships on the council. Unfortunately there is no definite proof, but rather only circumstantial evidence, that van Rentelen had been a leader of the "moderates." For what it may be worth, however, it was van Rentelen who had conferred with citizens on the expense of the "Wendish wars" in early 1405 (C **26**: p. 395). He also fits the pattern established in section 4 above for men who tended to be supporters or neutrals: a major merchant in the Baltic and to Flanders, he held substantial urban—but no rural—property. He was a Circle member, but also a "new man," with no known descent or marriage ties to Lubeck council families. In addition he was a "younger" councillor, chosen only in 1396, burgomaster just since 1402. When the uprising finally came, his son Kersten apparently was somewhat sympathetic to it (Nsb, p. 660; see note 57 above).

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damages.[103] These changes, made particularly in and after 1426, certainly were not the work of the exiles themselves. Nor is it likely that they could have been accomplished by the former proponents of the uprising alone, for while such men came to the post-1416 council in significant numbers, at no time did they comprise even a majority of the council.[104] The best explanation for them is the continued existence of a faction of "moderates" which carried the greatest weight in the new balance of power in Lubeck after 1416. In any case, while the eventual results of the uprising did not produce a "victory" for its former supporters, they apparently amounted to a "defeat" for the exiles.

One must conclude that the Lubeck uprising was basically a part of the normal political process of the town. It was made possible first of all by a gradual change in the composition of the town council, a change which brought a new generation of men with new policy ideas onto the council. In an effort to persuade the council to adopt these policies they took their ideas to the citizens. This division in the elite eventually led to a taxpayers' revolt which united men of various classes against one faction of the council. This movement sought initially to create institutions for citizen input into government; when these institutions were dissolved, however, an uprising became the only alternative for persons who desired changes in policy. Thus in spite of the expulsion of councillors and an eight-year struggle with the Hanseatic League and major rulers, the revolt must be judged a relatively moderate one, directed primarily toward altering governmental priorities.

If the episode itself was largely political in cause, however, that does not mean that it was purely local in significance. Since the efforts of these Lubeck citizens struck a responsive chord in Rostock, Wismar, and Hamburg, issues raised by the uprising must indicate some of the problems of fifteenth-century Hanseatic town government and the attitudes of townsmen toward their government. Of course, the immediate problem which sparked the uprising was financial and thus universal: taxes were too high. But along with such complaints came a desire to make town government better and to make councillors more responsive to citizens. Perhaps an appropriate symbol of the division between the dominant council faction and other councillors and citizens would be the walls which encircled the town. Government had fallen into the hands of a group whose economic and political interests to a great extent lay outside those walls, in land and territory. Citizens demanded instead a government by and for men like themselves: commercial men whose property was inside the walls, who would give their greatest attention to merchant needs and internal problems, and would consult with their fellow citizens before making policy decisions. The citizens of Lubeck were indeed defining the limits of power for their town—and for their council.

6. CONCLUSION: THE PURSUIT OF URBAN POWER

Much debate exists on the proper terminology to be used to describe these uprisings. As we have seen, some consider them "social movements," some "revolutionary," some "democratic," and so on.[105] If by a "social movement" one means a movement which formed primarily along class lines, then clearly the case of Lubeck in 1408 can-

[103] See LUB 7: no. 75. One might speculate that the resumption of the Danish wars in 1426, although it did not lead to an uprising here (as it did in Hamburg, Rostock, and Wismar in 1427), nevertheless had a profound impact on Lubeck politics, since the years 1426–1428 also saw the choices of councillors which permanently tipped the balance against the exiles (note 104 below).

[104] Numerically, the peak strength of supporters of the uprising came in 1416 itself, with nine of the twenty-seven councillors (33.3%); thereafter it shrank consistently, with 29.2 per cent in 1426, 24.1 per cent in 1428, 18.5 per cent in 1433, 18.2 per cent in 1438, 9.5 per cent in 1447. To some extent, of course, this reflects death taking its toll of supporters. Nevertheless even if one adds those "probably sympathetic to the uprising" to the above figures, thus including descendants of supporters, the strength never exceeds 41.6 per cent (10 of 24 in 1426) and fluctuates between that figure and one-third. While of course no document exists which would define a "moderate" faction, the figures for our "neutrals" (neither in exile nor in the new regime) make an interesting comparison, growing almost continuously from 25.9 per cent in 1416 (seven of twenty-seven) to a peak of 47.6 per cent (ten of twenty-one) in 1447. Adding the "probably sympathetic" persons to the "neutrals" produces a group with even more spectacular growth, from 29.6 per cent in 1416 (eight of twenty-seven) to a majority of the council by 1428 (sixteen of twenty-nine, or 55.2 per cent) and a peak of 71.4 per cent by 1447 (fifteen of twenty-one). Such numbers, of course, only broadly indicate the possible range of the factions; nevertheless they tend to confirm the general impression that while strong supporters of the uprising never dominated the council, another faction did, one which barred the exiles from power.

[105] See Rotz, 1973*a*: especially pp. 207–209, where the definitions used below are established, and Rotz, 1976. A particularly useful discussion of semantics relevant to the problem is Czok, 1958.

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not be judged a social movement. If by "revolutionary" one means that the movement intended to displace a governing class, then this case was also not revolutionary. If however by "revolution" one means a fundamental change in the form of government, then the question becomes more difficult to answer. The citizens unquestionably wished to establish new institutions which would increase participation in the making of important decisions. "Democratic" presents similar problems. While certainly there was no hint here of modern democratic principles such as egalitarianism—at no point, for example, did supporters of the uprising suggest that the privileges of citizenship be extended to all the town's inhabitants—such a broadening of the base of participation as they planned could perhaps be judged as making town government more "popular" than it had been.

Yet invariably when attempts are made to apply twentieth-century concepts to fourteenth- or fifteenth-century reality, the words will not quite fit. There is no indication of an informing ideology behind the various and scattered complaints of the citizenry. With the possible exception of the single point of seating a few artisans on the town council, certainly the supporters of the movement of 1408 did not think that they were "revolutionary," that they were making any fundamental changes in government. They were careful to preserve the counciliar form and to give their new regime the appearance of legitimacy through a formal transfer of power and approval by established authorities.[106] There may have been among the supporters a general feeling that in Lubeck there should be, in the more modern phrase, "no taxation without representation," and to the extent to which that idea may be "democratic" then so this movement might have been. But we are on much firmer ground if we restrict ourselves to terms which the citizens themselves would have understood—and from their point of view it seems likely that they felt that it was the council which was changing town government.

The foregoing investigation suggests that the Lubeck uprising of 1408 resulted primarily not from flaws in the urban economy or tensions in urban society but from problems of the pursuit of urban power. In fact, all the major issues which appear in the unrest come to a focus on the political actions of a faction of the Lubeck council. That faction had pursued power against its fellow citizens, against the surrounding nobility, and (through the Hansa) against the neighboring territorial states. In the uprising, citizens expressed their opposition to each of these policies.

We know regrettably little of the theories of government employed in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century towns. A recurrent theme in uprisings, however, is that the citizens claim only to be restoring their "old rights." One finds in their words and deeds a strong sense that their actions are legitimate—based, for example, on a belief that councils had no right to tax without some measure of consent from the citizenry. Increasingly, historians such as Wilfried Ehbrecht are convinced that such assertions were not merely propaganda developed for the occasion, but rather were derived from actual institutions and/or traditions which had fallen into disuse. The precise nature of these probably varied from town to town. In Cologne, for example, there may have been an assembly of citizens which had been the foundation of the town constitution, superior to the council. In Hamburg, apparently the council had at one time been limited by an advisory body called the *Wittigsten* ("the most important citizens"). In many towns, consultation with guild aldermen before major decisions were taken had been the rule. For some towns, such a belief by citizens might have been based on a remembrance of a communal or corporative origin. Whatever the particulars, it would seem that on the whole, in the thirteenth century and earlier, citizens perceived town government as a partnership between themselves and the council. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries councils gradually tried to transform this relationship into one of subjection of citizens to the council. The power to tax obviously was critical in this process of enlargement of council authority. Many uprisings began precisely with a formal citizen challenge to the legal right of the council to increase taxes or establish new taxes. Seen from this point of view, the Lubeck uprising of 1408 was in one sense an extended constitutional debate on just such questions. A faction of the council was attempting to exercise powers which citizens did not believe the council possessed, powers which would have placed urban citizens in a relationship to their government more akin to that of peasants to their manor lord. Thus citizens resisted the attempt of the council to impose a tax without their consent, and sought to

[106] C **26**: pp. 429–432; see note 38 above. Artisans were eligible for council service in some Hanseatic towns; see for example Brunswick, Rotz, 1973*a*: p. 217.

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institutionalize a process of government by partnership through their committees. In other words, the uprising appeared in part because citizens refused to accept the role of subjects to their council.[107]

The same desire—to limit the excessive exercise of power by a faction of the council—appears in the issues of foreign policy. There are several reasons why a town might have embarked on an ambitious policy of territorial expansion, and in the case of Lubeck in the second half of the fourteenth century they may all apply. There was the desire to control a zone of land for defense purposes and/or to provide a more certain supply of foodstuffs for its citizens; there was the desire to protect major commercial routes; there could also have been simply the desire to control territory, to increase power and influence, such as any governing authority might have. And, of course, there was the desire to protect or to create the opportunity for citizen investment in landed estates. Lubeck's policy in Lauenburg could have satisfied all these desires at once. In addition, historians have often remarked in passing about the tendency of urban elites to emulate the nobility, by investing in landed estates, engaging in jousts, reading of and admiring a "chivalric ideal," and so forth.[108] What emerges from studies of uprisings by Philippe Dollinger and others is an indication that such an attitude could have been of considerable political importance. Not surprisingly, such self-styled landed "town nobles" tended to pursue policies of territorial expansion, of frequent feuds and wars, as further imitation of noble practices. The tendency probably became more acute among men of long-established families: proud of their lineage, they might have felt "born to rule," and thus in practice have taken little notice of the wishes of their fellow citizens. Whether in fact the dominant faction of the Lubeck council was consciously imitating the nobility before 1408 is of course debatable, but, if so, the case would not be unique.[109] The possibility at least illustrates how

[107] On this point see above all the highly useful works of Ehbrecht, 1974*a* and 1974*b*, and the literature cited there. His "Bürgertum und Obrigkeit" (1974*a*) deals in some detail with Lubeck and establishes that at least in the early fourteenth century the Lubeck council had recognized the principle of citizen consultation with a council as an essential part of government. For Cologne, see the comments of Hugo Stehkämper following Ehbrecht, 1974*a* (p. 300), based on the catalog by T. Diederich of "Revolutionen in Köln 1074–1918" in the Cologne municipal archive. On the *Wittigsten* in Hamburg, see Koppmann, 1885, and Obst, 1890: p. 81. Stralsund, for example, may have once had an analogous institution: Fritze, 1961*a*: pp. 102–105. Note also the contention of the citizens of Brunswick in 1374 that the common council lacked the power to institute a new tax: Rotz, 1973*b*, and 1973*a*: p. 215.

[108] See for example Hofmann, 1966; Rörig, 1967: pp. 122–133; Dollinger, 1970: pp. 263–264, 400: Bautier, 1971: pp. 227–229; Mollat and Wolff, 1973: pp. 30–32; Berthold, Engel, and Laube, 1973: p. 208.

[109] Dollinger's comments are in his works on the upper Rhine, "Patriciat noble et patriciat bourgeois à Strasbourg" (1950) and "Le patriciat des villes du Rhin superieur et ses dissensions internes" (1953). There is a very clear relationship between imitation of the nobility and the Brunswick uprising of 1374, since that event was triggered in part by the town's costly defeat in a rather pointless feud, and possession of rural land separated the parties in the uprising to a considerable extent; see Hänselmann, 1887: pp. 106–107, and Rotz, 1973*a* and 1973*b*. Pointing out a possible connection between adoption of a noble life style and urban unrest is not, of course, to enter the debate as to why townsmen had acquired land in the first place. Some may have bought land in the search for a low-risk investment (Postan, 1952: pp. 216–218) or as a way of entering directly into production for the export trade in grain (Engel and Zientara, 1966). If one accepts the argument that urban elites developed originally from the small nobility and ministerials, for which evidence is increasingly mounting (Hibbert, 1953; Schulz, 1968; see also the excellent review of the entire ministerial problem by Freed, 1976), then some may have always held land. No matter how or for what reason the estates were acquired, if the urban estate holder had a desire to imitate the nobility, whether from ambition or birthright, and also controlled the government of a town, then he could have a profound and in the long run highly expensive effect on town policies.

It should be mentioned here that Ahasver von Brandt, who is generally regarded as the leading authority on the history of Lubeck, vigorously resists any suggestion that the ruling elite of that town had any inclination to imitate the nobility; to him, their possession of landed estates simply shows their desire for good, secure investments with steady return. He states that none of the great Lubeck families established residence in the countryside before the sixteenth century, and therefore none had adopted a noble life style (1966: pp. 233–234). The problem is, of course, that we are here dealing with attitudes that persons may have had, a subject which is always difficult, and frequently impossible, for which to find direct evidence in surviving documents. The actual shifting of principal residence to the landed estate is not directly relevant to the question at hand; a citizen who moved to the countryside would presumably lose much, if not all, of his influence on town decision-making, and it is precisely the decisions which are the critical element in the discussion of uprisings. The evidence assembled for the present study certainly shows that investment in rural land was well under way by 1400, as von Brandt readily admits (p. 233). Beyond that, one can only draw inferences from the actions of the landed councillors and of their opponents, and such inferences are unavoidably highly debatable. This writer would agree that unques-

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such seemingly disparate characteristics as investment in land, descent from an "old family," and reduction of merchant activity could, over time, help alter an urban citizen's attitude until he favored territorial expansion, took less notice of pirates or silted harbors, and became impatient with the requests citizens made of government.

But the chief councillors of Lubeck were also the leaders of the Hanseatic League. Although the Lubeck citizens made no direct criticism of the Hansa as a whole, certainly their actions in expelling men who had been the presiding officers of its diet, and the difficulties which the new regime found in its relations with the League, contain an implication which deserves to be explored. Citizens of Rostock, Wismar, and Hamburg rallied to the side of the new Lubeck regime in 1409–1410. While only further research will show whether the pattern established here for the Lubeck uprising was also typical of these other Hansa towns, there were at least superficial resemblances: they, too, were probably led by merchants, with only minority artisan support, and there were even similar complaints, such as the demand of Rostock citizens that men who held landed estates be barred from the town council.[110] The tensions between the new Lubeck regime and the Hanseatic League can no longer be dismissed as merchant hostility to an artisan government, since the new Lubeck council was dominated by active merchants. To some extent, of course, they reflect a desire of the Hansa towns to avoid the legal and political complications which might have arisen from having an "imperial outlaw" in their midst. The context of the internal and territorial issues of this uprising, however, introduces another possibility: that by the early fifteenth century, the average citizen of a Hansa town saw the League less as the protector of his commercial privileges than as a vehicle for the pursuit of power by his council. Councillors who strongly supported town territorial expansion, such as the Lubeck exiles, also tended to be vigorous champions of Hansa policies, for which there are historical as well as logical reasons. In the 1360's the Hansa embarked on the wars with Denmark which, after the Peace of Stralsund, made the League a true political power. This is precisely the same period when Lubeck began its vigorous policy of territorial acquisition, and presumably the same men, the burgomasters and leading councillors of Lubeck, helped develop both policies. Interestingly, it was also in the 1360's that the Hansa first began a policy of active intervention when member towns were threatened by uprisings. Evidence for the best-known example of such intervention, the exclusion from the Hansa of the new regime established by the Brunswick uprising of 1374, suggests that there the Hansa had sided with land-oriented councillors against a movement led by merchants and others of relatively high status who were basically trying to force a change in the town's costly policy of territorial expansion.[111] It seems likely, therefore, that by 1408 the Hansa was historically identified with policies which an anti-territorial, rebel regime such as Lubeck's would find it necessary to oppose. The League was closely associated with and its policies were in part developed by the expansionists on the Lubeck council. The Hansa had previously moved to put down uprisings, so that the new council could justifiably have feared such a move—as, of course, eventually came in 1416. Above all, League membership, for all its commercial value, required considerable expense on military expeditions, just as Lubeck's territorial holdings did. Time spent by a council on League affairs was time taken away from Lubeck's internal needs. Mutual hostility between the Hansa

tionably there were fewer tendencies to imitate the nobility in a seaport town like Lubeck than in inland towns like Brunswick or Nuremberg; nevertheless they existed, as Wehrmann, 1872, establishes. Further, one can in fact document one case of a great Lubeck family, the van Attendorns, which was making the transition to a fully noble life style in the era of the uprising. Gottschalk I was a Lubeck councillor (1356–1388) and merchant who acquired four manors (at least two of them by purchase); his grandson Gottschalk III came to style himself Lord of Culpin (in Ratzeburg) and was recognized as a small noble no later than 1433 (See LUB **5**: no. 518; **7**: nos. 531, 792–793; and Rotz, 1975). This, of course, proves no more than that the idea of making such a transition can be found in Lubeck in the period with which we are concerned; beyond that there is only speculation and guesswork. But if the interpretation suggested here is correct, then by stopping the further penetration of both Lubeck and her citizens on to the land, the uprising itself may be the reason why no further examples of the full completion of this process have been found in Lubeck before the sixteenth century.

[110] There is some evidence for the composition of the forces in Hamburg: see Rotz, 1976. The complaint about landed councillors in Rostock, plus other fragmentary information about Rostock and Wismar in 1409–1410, together with much fuller accounts of 1426–1428, may be found in Fritze, 1967*b*: p. 57 and 1967*a*: pp. 180–245. Note also Czok, 1963: pp. 103–106 and Hamann, 1956: pp. 109–110.

[111] Rotz, 1973*a*: pp. 210–219.

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and the new government emerged naturally from the policies which that government followed.[112]

But if such a correspondence of attitudes existed, then the Hanseatic League was no longer the organization of and the expression of the interests of the German merchants, or at least not all of them. According to the evidence above, many of the most active merchants of Lubeck supported the new regime. The exiles were on the whole a less commercial faction of the elite, and citizens opposed them in part because they had given insufficient attention to mercantile needs. If merchant citizens of a seaport town like Lubeck could perceive the Hansa as standing against their interests and for the exiles, then whether such a view was justified or not, the Hansa was beginning to lose the support of the very persons for whom it supposedly existed.

Such a possibility is not as startling as it might seem, in the light of the literature reviewed at the outset of this investigation. As Dollinger has pointed out, the fourteenth-century transition from the "Hansa of the merchants" to the "Hansa of the towns" bought political power, but at the price of subjecting the merchant communities to the authority of the town councils.[113] If the merchants came to believe that the struggle for power was too costly, then they might also have come to resent the authority. We have seen that Rörig's view of a largely *"rentier"* Hansa ruling elite, at sharp economic odds with its commercial population, needs to be modified; nevertheless the evidence for the alignment of forces in the Lubeck uprising of 1408 still tends to support his basic perception that over time there was indeed less and less identity between Hanseatic leadership and Hanseatic merchants, at least on questions of policy. Fritze's concept of a selfish Hanseatic leadership seeking power at all costs is also undoubtedly too harsh, but after the Danish intervention, if not before, there might well have been supporters of the new Lubeck council who would have agreed with such an assessment. The differences between the new Lubeck regime and the Hansa could be explained, and some accord among these authorities found, if there was a split between the Hansa's leaders and its merchants on the proper role of the Hansa, a citizen feeling that, like the Lubeck council, the Hansa's priorities had become more political than commercial.

Whether the councillors were actually "abusing" their power or misdirecting the Hansa is, of course, just as debatable as the wisdom of their territorial policy. What is significant is that important segments of the citizenry, including merchants, may have thought that they were. This is not to say that the opposition in Lubeck consciously revolted "against" the Hanseatic League, but rather only that by the turn of the fifteenth century there may have been many merchants who felt that the League's struggle for political power, like the town's land and castles, cost too much, and served the councillors' glory more than the merchants' interests. If so, then urban uprisings in Hansa towns were both a cause and a symptom of the "decline of the Hanseatic League": a cause, since disorders weakened the Hansa's ability to maintain a united front and thus affected its posture against both its commercial and its governmental enemies, but also a symptom, because Hansa leadership had apparently passed to men who were, perhaps, "conservative," but more importantly, to men who had lost touch with their citizens, men for whom political considerations may have outweighed economic ones. The Lubeck uprising suggests that only a fragment of the citizenry of the towns—certain powerful councillors and their intimates—strongly supported the League's stance as a "great power." Most citizens of Hansa towns, including a substantial portion of the commercial elite, did not want their towns to be territorial powers, either individually or collectively—or at least they did not want to pay for such power. Parallels between the Hanseatic League and Italian towns are often cited: the Hansa towns occupy roughly the same position, both geographically and historically, in the economic development of northern Europe that the major Italian commercial cities did in the economy of the Mediterranean world. Like certain Italian cities, too, the Hansa towns sought in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to translate their economic power into political dominance. Their opportunities for such power, considering the weaknesses of the empire in the north and of the Scandinavian monarchies, were at least equal, if

[112] Czok, 1956 and 1957, supported by Neuss, 1965, has suggested that leagues of towns from their very inception included, in addition to the generally accepted economic and/or political functions, an intent to provide each town's ruling group with collective security against uprisings. See also above (section 1), and the works cited in note 23. Rörig, 1971: pp. 160–166, while not directly relevant, certainly indicates his belief that the "conservative" attitudes of Hansa leadership affected virtually every aspect of Hansa policy.

[113] Dollinger, 1970: pp. 62–67. To this and the following, see above, section 1.

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not superior, to those of the Italians. Nevertheless Lubeck was not Venice. The "Queen of the Hansa" may have had the same ambitions to empire as a Venice, but she and her citizens had nothing like the same wealth to support these ambitions.[114]

The conclusions above are speculative—directions in which the evidence seems to point. The preceding summary may imply greater unity in the design of the supporters of the uprising than in fact existed. Nevertheless, the citizens' words and actions indicate that, whether they were aware of it or not, they had a concept of their town as something separate from the feudal order, and they expected their government to reflect that separation. They did not want to be subjects of the council, nor did they feel that the council should rule in the same way, with the same goals, as nobles, princes, and kings. A large portion of the citizenry had come to the conclusion that certain councillors were behaving more like feudal lords than townsmen. The first attempts to alter policies came from colleagues of these councillors; when the council became divided by factions, it gave citizens the opportunity to join together in an attempt to make their government more responsive.

It is important to remember the warning with which this study began; to explain one uprising is not to explain them all. Even in Lubeck itself the citizen movements of the 1370's and 1380's have different alignments of forces, different causes, and different results. Nevertheless it seems likely that some of the other uprisings which, like this one, have previously been judged social or economic conflicts deserve renewed investigation. The Lubeck uprising of 1408 was an effort by taxpayers to change the direction town government was taking, to limit the town council's pursuit of power both inside and outside the walls. Thus it tells us very little of urban class tensions, but says much about political attitudes and the political process in a fifteenth-century town.

[114] The Lubeck-Venice parallel has been made, although not precisely in this way, by von Brandt, 1954: pp. 147–164. See also the comparisons made by, for example, Bautier, 1971: p. 121, and Lopez, 1952: p. 291, and 1971: pp. 113–119.

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